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COLOMBIA RESILIENT COMMUNITIES MIDTERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FINAL REPORT

An Evaluation for Learning, Evaluation, and Research Activity II

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This midterm evaluation of the Resilient Communities (*Somos Comunidad*) Activity was conducted by a team of international and local consultants fielded and managed by The Cloudburst Group, namely Dr. Javier Osorio (Co-Lead), Dr. Liliana Duica-Amaya (Co-Lead), Dr. Daniel Mejia Londoño (Citizen Security Expert), and Daniela Maria Ospina Gonzalez (Research Analyst).

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CONTENTS

ACRONYMS	IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	5
1. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE.....	11
2. METHODOLOGY.....	18
3. EQ1. CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICE RESPONSIVENESS AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS.....	23
4. EQ2: CONTRIBUTIONS TO CVP AND IBPS	27
5. EQ3. ADVANCEMENTS IN SOCIAL COHESION	29
6. EQ4. COMMUNITY PROTECTION	31
7. EQ5. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND ENABLING ENVIRONMENT	34
8. EQ6: LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF CITIZEN SECURITY	37
REFERENCES	40
ANNEX A: EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK	45
ANNEX B: TIMELINE	52
ANNEX C: LIMITATIONS.....	54
ANNEX D: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS TOOLS.....	58
ANNEX E: TYPES OF KII INTERVIEWEES AND FGD PARTICIPANTS CONSULTED	65
ANNEX F: SOURCES OF INFORMATION	71
ANNEX G: EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS	73
ANNEX H: POTENTIAL SYNERGIES WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES	75

ACRONYMS

AMELP	Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan
CAB	Community Action Board
CEDE	Center for Studies on Economic Development (Universidad de los Andes)
CNC	National Consulting Center (Centro Nacional de Consultoría)
CNP	Colombian National Police
CNSCC	National Code of Citizen Security and Coexistence
COP	Colombian peso
CRI	Community Resilience Index
CSO	Civil society organization
CVP	Crime and violence prevention
DANE	National Administrative Department of Statistics (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística)
ELN	National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
EQ	Evaluation question
ET	Evaluation team
FARC	Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)
FGD	Focus group discussion
GOC	Government of Colombia
ICBF	Colombian Institute of Family Welfare
IBP	Positive balance initiative (Iniciativas de Balance Positivo)
IP	Implementing partner
IRB	Institutional Review Board
KII	Key Informant Interview
PADF	Pan American Development Foundation (Fundación Panamericana para el Desarrollo, FUPAD)
PISCC	Comprehensive Security and Coexistence Plan (Plan Integral de Seguridad y Convivencia)
PAS	Psychoactive substances
RCT	Randomized Controlled Trial
SENA	Learning National Service
UNP	National Protection Unit (Unidad Nacional de Protección)
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October 2020, the United States Agency for International Development's (USAID's) Mission to Colombia partnered with the Pan American Development Foundation (PADF) to implement the Resilient Communities (*Somos Comunidad*) Activity to strengthen trust, collaboration, and communication within and among communities and security sector stakeholders to increase citizen security, thereby increasing community resilience in a set of priority municipalities in Colombia. Resilient Communities aims to advance two primary goals: First, it **strengthens communities** by strengthening bonds of trust among neighbors, increasing civilian confidence in the police, and fostering the development and implementation of citizen-responsive security mechanisms to address communities' security needs. Second, the Activity **strengthens institutional capacities** to mitigate the effects of crime and violence by improving relational policing methods to increase dialogue and build trust between police, communities, and local authorities. PADF has served as the primary implementing partner (IP) leading and coordinating the efforts of a set of collaborating organizations.

This midterm performance evaluation of Resilient Communities focuses on the pilot phase of the Activity implemented in ten municipalities over the past two years (2021-2022). The evaluation—which includes primary data collected in Bogotá and five of the ten pilot municipalities—serves to identify and elaborate on the Resilient Communities Activity's successes and challenges experienced thus far, toward contributing to adaptations in current programmatic efforts as well as future investments in community resilience and citizen security in Colombia.

BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The ten pilot municipalities of the Resilient Communities Activity, of the 35 planned, are mainly concentrated along the Caribbean coast, as well as the northeast of the country (near the Venezuelan border) and the southwest. As detailed in the report, these ten pilot municipalities prioritized by Resilient Communities suffer from endemic security problems, including high levels of violence generated by armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other illegal activities. For example, between 2016 and 2019, pilot municipalities had an average homicide rate more than twice the homicide rate in rural municipalities in the same period, and almost two-and-a-half times higher than that of all municipalities in Colombia. In addition, the pilot municipalities had kidnapping and massacre rates that, on average, were more than double those observed for rural municipalities in Colombia.

In parallel to these security problems, these pilot municipalities also experience deleterious socioeconomic conditions: low levels of economic development and income, high poverty, and high adolescent fertility rates. The ten pilot municipalities of the Resilient Communities Activity have very low levels of institutional capacity, low income levels, and very deep social and economic problems, which exacerbate the vulnerability of their populations to insecurity and violence.

METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

The Resilient Communities midterm performance evaluation, undertaken through USAID's Learning, Evaluation, and Research (LER II) activity, includes six core evaluation questions (EQs), detailed further below. The questions, developed by the evaluation team (ET) in consultation with the Mission, assess Resilient Communities' progress to date in enhancing social cohesion and strengthening citizen-responsive security within Activity implementation communities. Resilient Communities comprises a multitude of IPs engaged in a broad range of programmatic activities. The midterm evaluation considered several specific activities that can be grouped into the following categories: i) positive balance initiatives (*Iniciativas de Balance Positivo*—IBPs); ii) crime and violence prevention (CVP) initiatives; iii) organizational capabilities,

social control, and conflict resolution; iv) resilience capabilities and tools for social leaders; v) capacities and tools for community and individual protection; vi) organizational capacity development and psychosocial skills; and vii) relational policing strategies and police dialogues.

The evaluation includes rich qualitative data from diverse groups of stakeholders and Activity participants that the ET collected via key informant interviews (KII) and focus group discussions (FGDs). The ET conducted data collection in August and September 2023 in Bogotá and five of Resilient Communities's ten pilot communities: Tierralta (Córdoba), El Guamo (Bolívar), El Carmen de Bolívar (Bolívar), Santander de Quilichao (Cauca), and San Andrés de Tumaco (Nariño). A parallel quantitative survey of Resilient Communities participants (beneficiaries) was discontinued due to challenges uncovered in the piloting phase—most notably, challenges reaching and interviewing a sufficient sample of Activity participants within the municipalities, as well as poor recall of activities among those participants interviewed.

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The evaluation's key findings, conclusions, and recommendations, organized by each of the six core EQs, are specified below and elaborated upon in greater detail in the main body of the report.

EQ1. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy that contributes to police provisioning responsive services to communities and to a more legitimate, trustworthy, and responsive relationship between police and communities? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities?

Overall, Resilient Communities Activity participants, particularly in urban areas, reported that social cohesion improved as a result of the Resilient Communities strategy focused on dialogue, empathy, and trust between the police and the community (EQ1). Youth participants also reported positive experiences of inclusion, although youth participants often were unable to recall the Activity's overall strategy. Youth as a whole face great challenges, including the widespread availability of narcotics, micro-trafficking networks, high rates of un- and under-employment, stigmatization, the risk of recruitment by armed actors, and police mistreatment. High turnover among Colombian National Police (CNP) personnel undermines relationships of trust and legitimacy as the police responsiveness "learning curve"—developed gradually between the police and the community—is lost with each re-deployment. In rural areas, communities generally report low levels of trust and poor rapport with police, although Resilient Communities has contributed to the strengthening of relations between the community and local institutions and to de-escalating community conflicts. Specific recommendations under this EQ include:

- **PADF should implement a "train the trainers" program for the CNP** so that the group champions and disseminates the Resilient Communities approach more broadly within the police. A train-the-trainers model would help imbed knowledge within the CNP and reduce challenges related to turnover and transfers within the municipal police departments.
- **PADF should modify the CNP training to emphasize inclusivity**, particularly how the police can serve as a source of legitimacy in marginalized communities. In particular, training should emphasize how to work with LGBTQI+ populations, women, victims, ethnic groups, and youth affairs and their role as a source of legitimacy in the communities.
- **PADF should better coordinate with local administrations and CNP to minimize duplication of efforts.** For example, Resilient Communities began working on drug use prevention in Tumaco at the same time that the municipality was carrying out training with youth, duplicating efforts that could have been better coordinated.

EQ2. To what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy to support **crime and violence prevention (CVP) and **positive balance initiatives (IBPs)** that is based on evidence and is responsive to community needs? Has the strategy contributed to communities appropriating measures from supported CVPs and IBPs and to a positive perception of their effectiveness? How?**

Activity participants, particularly the civil society organizations (CSOs), report positively about the CVP and IBP strategy being a bridge between the state and the communities. All of the directly interviewed beneficiaries perceived the implementation of the CVP and IBP strategies as positive. Beneficiaries emphasize their engagement in the design of these activities and thus consider them articulated to their needs.

Overall, the CVP and IBP effort to bridge government agencies with highly vulnerable sectors of the population is a successful strategy for meeting the Resilient Communities Activity's objectives. The most effective part of the strategy is the CVP's and IBPs' focus on highly vulnerable populations, particularly women, the LGBTQI+ community, social leaders, Indigenous people, and youth. This focus is unique among other state and donor activities. However, multiple FGD participants noted a desire for CVP interactions to be longer-term to better help communities achieve their goals, and the evaluation did not find any evidence of communities appropriating measures from supported CVPs and IBPs at this stage of the Activity. Specific recommendations under EQ2 include:

- **Resilient Communities should increase the length of the CVP and IBP intervention to increase the impact and sustainability for communities.** A sustained follow-up strategy would allow the IP to disseminate and reinforce key concepts, listen and adapt to the evolving needs of program participants, and track longer-term changes and investments based on the CVP. A longer implementation timeline would also allow deeper trust and relationship building between the Activity and program participants.
- **Resilient Communities should continue to utilize attractive media tailored to targeted populations.** The variety of media used in the workshops (dances, painting, influencers) made CVP and IBP initiatives engaging and effective. The Activity should continue to use these tools and be sure to make better cultural and differential readings of the targeted population, especially youth and Indigenous communities.

EQ3. To what extent has the methodology implemented by Resilient Communities, through local subgrantee **Pastoral Social, been comprehensive and effective in **advancing social cohesion** in target communities?**

Overall, the strategy implemented by Pastoral Social has been methodologically solid and highly participatory, engaging program beneficiaries and previously marginalized groups, including ethnic communities, LGBTQI+, and women. It has helped define problems and facilitated the identification of priority issues for intervention communities. The strategy was designed based on evidence from primary and secondary sources and implemented by knowledgeable facilitators familiar with the realities in the territories. For these reasons, the ET found that the Pastoral Social methodology is a comprehensive and effective approach to advancing social cohesion in targeted communities. Recommendations aligned with this EQ include:

- **PADF should further leverage the effectiveness of Pastoral Social by expanding the number of beneficiary CSOs.** This would create further synergies with CSOs and promote community integration. At the same time, further incorporating a youth-specific focus into Pastoral Social's ongoing work, and targeting youth participants in the broadest possible range of

activities, would help address the concerns raised by many evaluation respondents about youth as a critically vulnerable and important stakeholder group.

- **PADF/Pastoral Social should adapt the violence tracker into Emberá.** Adapting tools such as the "Violentómetro" (violence tracker) to the Emberá language to facilitate the understanding of this tool and empower the population in these communities is vital. The ET recommends that Pastoral Social engage with experts in Emberá cultural management to develop a differential approach.

EQ4. To what extent has the Resilient Communities strategy to support **protection at the community level been implemented as planned and been effective in reducing risk factors? How has the strategy responded and adapted to the needs of social leaders and ethnic organizations?**

The evaluation participants reported that the Resilient Communities Activity has been effective in reducing risk factors, especially those focused on community-level protection tools for the prioritized population groups. The risk mapping process identifies community problems and helps to design protection protocols based on their needs. Those inputs become part of Comprehensive Security and Coexistence Plans (Plan Integral de Seguridad y Convivencia—PISCCs). Evaluation participants highlighted gaining knowledge of the care route for women victims of violence (the “purple line”), the implementation of Law 1801/2016, and collaboration with grassroots organizations and social leaders as positive factors.

In parallel, however, security in rural areas in the municipalities evaluated has deteriorated for reasons exogenous to Resilient Communities and participants perceive that the strategy focuses too narrowly on direct beneficiaries and not on strengthening communities more broadly. In Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco, and Tierralta, the security situation is especially critical—both urban and rural violence has worsened. In one sense, participants consider the strategy effective in raising awareness that security depends on community strengthening. Participants highlight initiatives such as community Whatsapp groups and meetings to discuss risks as effective individual self-protection mechanisms. However, self-protection is insufficient if it is not institutionally supported. In another sense, therefore, communities are concerned about the end of Resilient Communities because they consider the Activity to be a bridge between communities and local governments. In addition, participants indicated that improving coordination of other USAID-supported programs could generate positive synergies. Specific recommendations under this EQ include:

- **PADF should improve coordination between the Resilient Communities Activity and local institutions in Tumaco and Tierralta,** two of the locales with the most critical security conditions. CNP would benefit from a better understanding of Resilient Communities. PADF should review the plans, programs, and activities implemented by CNP to better harmonize activities with the communities.
- **PADF should update risk maps while taking into consideration youth as a highly vulnerable and critical group.** Similarly, the ET recommends updating the risk map of the Embera community in Tierralta by engaging people who have knowledge of the Indigenous communities and their language to transmit and adapt the protection tools.
- **PADF should continue to raise awareness about Resilient Communities among new mayors.** The ET recommends PADF and IPs update the risk maps, participate in the construction and socialization of the new municipal development plans, and take part in the debates in the municipal councils. PADF could take part in the updates of the PISCCs and socialize the methodologies, primers, and batteries of indicators with the new administrations to encourage their use. In this sense, the products produced by the Resilient Communities strategy could be delivered as a sort of "toolbox" to the new administrations.

EQ5. How is the Resilient Communities strategy engaging with the most relevant **institutional stakeholders and enabling the environment for effective, responsive, and actionable protection strategies? What have been the **bottlenecks and opportunities** in this process?**

The Resilient Communities Activity has been effective in engaging with relevant institutional actors of the local security system and with strategic partners at the national level, building communication channels with the institutions and generating spaces for dialogue and decision-making articulated with social organizations that did not exist before the strategy. What particularly stands out from the evaluation data includes the solid relationship at the national level with the CNP, the Ombudsman's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Inspector General's Office; the articulation in the National Guarantees Board about violence against women is more visible; the tools for CNP (risk mapping); and the improvement of communities' abilities to express their needs more effectively through direct communication to institutions. However, the frequent turnover of local officials leads to a loss of momentum and continuity for the Activity. Specific recommendations related to this EQ include:

- **PADF should offer recurrent training opportunities for mayors' offices and local strategic partners** to reduce disruptions by personnel turnover. The constant change of officials within the mayor's offices and police commands requires continual socialization of the strategy. Enhancing the visibility of the products that PADF and the IPs have developed (protocols, policies, batteries of indicators) would help fill in the gaps affected by turnover.
- **USAID/Colombia should increase coordination and promote additional synergies** across activities operating in the same locales. The Ombudsman's Office, the Inspector General's Office, the police, Pastoral Social, and Activity participants (Tumaco) cited synergistic opportunities across USAID activities in the territories. USAID could increase coordination between the different USAID implementers operating in the areas to help promote these synergies.
- **PADF should elevate the visibility of the Resilient Communities Activity** and highlight the outcomes achieved on mediation, psychosocial support, self-protection, and community strengthening in vulnerable populations. Enhanced visibility of the activities could contribute to tackling the loss of knowledge due to the regular personnel turnover within the mayor's offices and police commands.

EQ6. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities contributed to creating, adapting, or implementing policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, and procedures that improve **local management of citizen security? What have been the **bottlenecks and opportunities** in this process?**

The creation of procedures and protocols is the greatest contribution of the Resilient Communities Activity to improve local management of citizen security. The “purple line” (Guamo, Tierralta), the women and gender policy (Guamo, Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco), the Coexistence Code (Santander de Quilichao), the public mental health policy (Santander de Quilichao), the LGBTQI+ policy, and the “Let's Talk about Police” dialogues all stand out. On the other hand, evaluation participants reported that the frequent rotation of public officials, which delays processes and continuity in implementation, is a barrier. Recommendations under EQ6 include:

- **PADF should strengthen training in alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution to resolve coexistence issues.** Although the strategy carries out workshops to improve citizen coexistence, it is necessary to maintain constant training adapted to the cultural characteristics of each territory and the needs of the most vulnerable groups (mainly youth and Indigenous people).

- **USAID/Colombia should consider a youth program that uses sports, arts, and culture to address community management of citizen security.** Sports in preventing youth crime strategies have been implemented in places such as Brazil¹ and have shown a positive impact on crime prevention. The program could provide tools and resources for youths to realize their talents and skills through sport, art, and culture, and provide both ways to prevent the involvement of youth in crime, trafficking, and illegal networks and a platform to share strategies for managing citizen security.

SUMMARY

Overall, the midterm evaluation of the Resilient Communities Activity found that the strategy has been successful in improving trust in and legitimacy of the police and improving police-community relationships; improving social cohesion, notably through the work of Pastoral Social; articulating and reducing risk factors via the risk mapping process; strengthening communication and coordination with institutional stakeholders; and developing procedures and protocols to improve local management of citizen security. The evaluation data also highlighted several challenges related to the Activity, including the worsening security context in some municipalities; high turnover among local personnel and officials, particularly within CNP and mayor's offices; and the critical needs and vulnerability of the youth, which cuts across other targeted population groups (e.g., women, LGBTQI+, Indigenous, etc.).

¹ See GIZ (2017).

I. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE

In October 2020, USAID's Mission to Colombia partnered with PADF to implement Resilient Communities (Somos Comunidad) to increase community-level safety and resilience to crime and violence in a set of priority municipalities in Colombia. This Activity seeks to strengthen trust, collaboration, and communication within and among communities and Government of Colombia (GOC) security sector stakeholders to increase citizen security, thereby increasing community resilience. To implement Resilient Communities, PADF has served as the primary IP leading and coordinating the efforts of a set of collaborating organizations that contribute to a variety of tasks.

Overall, Resilient Communities focuses on 35 municipalities affected by harsh security conditions in Colombia. In the pilot stage, Resilient Communities concentrated its activities on ten municipalities. Based on the lessons derived from the pilot municipalities, the Activity expanded to the other 25 municipalities considered in its work plan. For this mid-term performance evaluation, the analysis will concentrate on the initial list of ten pilot municipalities:

- Sardinata in Norte de Santander
- Caucasia in Antioquia
- San Jacinto in Bolívar
- Cáceres in Antioquia
- Tierralta in Córdoba
- Valencia in Córdoba
- El Guamo in Bolívar
- El Carmen de Bolívar in Bolívar
- Santander de Quilichao in Cauca
- San Andrés de Tumaco in Nariño

The theory of change of Resilient Communities is as follows:

If the security-related institutions of Colombia work together with communities in conflict-affected areas to proactively improve local systems security, making them sustainable and responsive to the community, and if the activity contributes to strengthening the social fabric through dialogue and confidence-building to mitigate the relevant threats in the target areas, then the communities will be more resilient against the effects of organized crime and violence.

I.I. EVALUATION PURPOSE

The purpose of this midterm evaluation is to assess the Activity's effectiveness and evaluate its progress toward its two major objectives: **enhanced social cohesion** and **strengthened citizen-responsive security**. The evaluation will identify if the Activity is achieving the stated objectives and contributing to broader USAID/Colombia objectives under the Mission's Country Development Cooperation Strategy and make recommendations for future USAID/Colombia programming in community security and resilience.

In consultation with the Mission, the evaluation focused on years 1 and 2 of the Activity, with the aim of assessing the pilot programing and supporting policy design and decision-making. The team selected five of the ten pilot Resilient Communities municipalities for data collection:

- Tierralta (Córdoba)
- El Guamo (Bolívar)
- El Carmen de Bolívar (Bolívar)
- Santander de Quilichao (Cauca)
- San Andrés de Tumaco (Nariño)

The ET focused on key Colombian stakeholders and Activity beneficiaries identified via Activity documents and in collaboration with the Mission and IPs. As described in more detail below, KIIs and FGDs collected rich qualitative data from the various stakeholders and beneficiaries, including representatives from civil society, police, education institutes, peasant associations, and non-affiliated beneficiaries.

I.2 EVALUATION QUESTIONS

There are six core EQs for the Resilient Communities evaluation, developed by USAID/Colombia in consultation with the ET:

EQ1. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy that contributes to police providing responsive services to communities and to a more legitimate, trustworthy, and responsive relationship between police and communities? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities?

EQ2. To what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy to support crime and violence prevention (CVP) and positive balance initiatives (IBPs) that is based on evidence and is responsive to community needs? Has the strategy contributed to communities appropriating measures from supported CVPs and IBPs and to a positive perception of their effectiveness? How?

EQ3. To what extent has the methodology implemented by Resilient Communities, through local subgrantee Pastoral Social, been comprehensive and effective in advancing social cohesion in target communities?

EQ4. To what extent has the Resilient Communities strategy to support protection at the community level been implemented as planned and been effective in reducing risk factors? How has the strategy responded and adapted to the needs of social leaders and ethnic organizations?

EQ5. How is the Resilient Communities strategy engaging with the most relevant institutional stakeholders and enabling the environment for effective, responsive, and actionable protection strategies? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities in this process?

EQ6. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities contributed to creating, adapting, or implementing policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, and procedures that improve local management of citizen security? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities in this process?

I.3 EVALUATION TEAM

The ET consisted of academic and policy experts in Latin American and Colombian citizen security issues. Dr. Javier Osorio, evaluation co-lead, is a political scientist and an assistant professor in the School of

Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. He specializes in security challenges in Latin America, as well as quantitative methods of analysis. Dr. Liliana Duica Amaya, evaluation co-lead, is an anthropologist and a lecturer in the Center for Latin American Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Department of Anthropology at Georgetown University. Her expertise is in post-conflict policies on land titling, rural development, and state building, as well as qualitative methods. Dr. Daniel Mejia Londoño, citizen security expert and economist, is an associate professor at the Department of Economics at Universidad de los Andes and former Director of Policy and Strategy of the Attorney General's Office in Colombia. Ms. Daniela Maria Ospina Gonzalez, a final-year student in political science and global studies at the Universidad de los Andes, serves as the ET research analyst. Annex G provides additional details related to the ET composition.

I. 4 SECURITY AND SOCIOECONOMIC CONTEXT

Figure 1 below depicts the ten pilot municipalities for the Resilient Communities Activity. These municipalities are located on the Caribbean coast (seven municipalities), in the Northeast of the country near the border with Venezuela (one municipality), and in the Southwest of the country (two municipalities). Among the ten pilot Resilient Communities municipalities, locales highlighted in yellow indicate municipalities where the ET conducted qualitative interviews for the purpose of this performance evaluation (the Methodology section below provides more detail regarding the selection of these study sites). The ET did not visit municipalities highlighted in green, but did consider additional information about them based on the Activity's documentation.

Figure 1: Location of the ten Resilient Communities intervention municipalities



Historically, the populations in these ten pilot municipalities have suffered from very high levels of violence generated by armed groups linked to drug trafficking, illegal mining, and other illegal activities. In several

of these municipalities, illegal armed groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and National Liberation Army guerrillas, as well as paramilitary groups, committed massacres against the civilian population, generated their forced displacement, carried out forced recruitment of minors to join their ranks, and committed a broad range of crimes and abuses against civilians. This is reflected in the fact that the ten municipalities prioritized by Resilient Communities have suffered endemic security problems, as reflected in Table 1, below. The pilot municipalities had an average homicide rate between 2016 and 2019 of 66 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants—more than twice the homicide rate in rural municipalities in the same period (31.1) and almost two-and-a-half times higher than the homicide rate for all municipalities in Colombia. Three out of the ten pilot municipalities had homicide rates between 2016 and 2019 that exceeded 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants: Cáceres (159.4), Caucasia (106.4), and San Andrés de Tumaco (82.6). Also, the pilot municipalities had kidnappings and massacre rates that, on average, are more than double those observed for rural municipalities in Colombia.

For those crimes more closely associated with citizen security, the pilot municipalities have an average vehicle theft rate of 79.3—more than twice the average of rural municipalities and relatively similar to that observed in the country as a whole. The rate of muggings in the pilot municipalities (120) is much higher than that of rural municipalities in the country (74.2), but much lower than that observed for the entire country (higher than 477). Finally, the rate of sexual crimes in the pilot municipalities is relatively similar to that observed in rural municipalities (48.7 vs. 54) but lower than that observed for the country as a whole (66.2). The historical background of violence and exposure to crime in these communities undermined social cohesion and eroded cooperation and trust between the civilian population and the police. Resilient Communities directly addresses this challenge by focusing on strengthening social cohesion and cooperation ties between communities, local authorities, and the police.

The endemic security conditions affecting the areas of the Resilient Communities intervention pose several specific challenges. In particular, the presence of non-state armed actors such as insurgent organizations, paramilitary groups, and organized criminals is likely to erode the capacity of the state and allow these armed groups to exercise effective control on the population, a phenomenon known as “rebel governance” when conducted by insurgent organizations (Arjona, 2016) or “criminal governance” when implemented by criminal organizations (Lessing, 2020). Although governance by non-state armed actors often thrives in remote areas far from state control (Scott, 2010), armed governance is not exclusive to rural areas and often coexists with state institutions in urban centers (Arias, 2017). The entrenchment of armed governance could be so deeply rooted that even large-scale efforts to increase state capacity and the provision of public goods and services find it difficult to erode criminal governance, as shown in a rigorous experimental evaluation in Colombia (Blattman et al., 2019).

However, in contrast to the common association between high levels of insecurity and low levels of social cohesion (Entorf and Spengler, 2000), some emerging research suggests that exposure to conflict and crime may be associated with higher levels of pro-democratic behavior and civic participation (Bateson, 2012; Blattman, 2009). This positive relationship would suggest an opportunity for Resilient Communities to reinforce social capital in communities affected by crime and violence in order to promote social cohesion and more effective engagement with government institutions.

Table 1: Security conditions in the ten Resilient Communities intervention municipalities (2016–2019)

Municipality	Homicide rate	Sex crime rate	Vehicle theft rate	Muggings rate	Massacres rate	Kidnapping rate	Human trafficking rate
El Carmen De Bolívar	21.3	54.6	52.0	120.6	0.0	0.0	0.0
El Guamo	0.0	26.1	8.9	23.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
San Andrés De Tumaco	82.6	30.3	41.5	64.5	0.3	0.3	0.5
Santander De Quilichao	69.3	84.5	281.1	394.6	0.0	0.0	0.5
Tierralta	25.1	58.0	33.5	28.9	0.0	0.0	0.0
Weighted avg in 5 municipalities (Interviews)	60.5	49.4	90.4	133.2	0.1	0.1	0.3
Caucasia	106.3	56.5	83.1	158.6	0.8	0.8	0.0
Cáceres	159.4	32.0	27.5	28.5	0.8	0.8	0.0
San Jacinto	4.2	41.6	19.8	60.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Sardinata	65.1	44.9	51.5	18.9	0.0	0.0	2.1
Valencia	12.7	40.0	5.6	10.5	0.0	0.0	0.0
Weighted avg in 5 municipalities (No Interviews)	80.3	46.9	50.3	85.4	0.5	0.5	0.3
Weighted avg in 10 municipalities	66.0	48.7	79.3	120.0	0.2	0.2	0.3
Weighted avg all rural municipalities	31.1	54.0	39.5	74.2	0.1	0.1	0.4
Weighted average all Colombian municipalities	26.3	66.2	88.5	477.6	0.0	0.0	0.8

Source: ET calculations based on information from the Ministry of Defense, the National Police, and the National Administrative Department of Statistics.

In addition to the crime statistics highlighted above, it is important to consider the nature of insecurity in the pilot municipalities. Many of these locales suffer from crime and violence related to small but prevalent criminal groups primarily operating in urban areas, as well as security threats from large non-state armed actors (insurgent groups, criminal organizations, and paramilitary groups) mostly in rural areas. In this way, these municipalities comprise a variety of citizen security challenges stemming from different sources. Relatedly, the state response to those distinct threats involved different institutional approaches, primarily involving regular policing for crime control policies in urban settings, while often engaging in counter-insurgency efforts in rural areas. The nature of the insecurity as well as the government response also shapes the interactions and levels of trust that communities have toward the state. Social cohesion and levels of institutional trust are probably lower in contexts affected by endemic crime and violence, as well as by harsh security policies (Entorf and Spengler, 2000).

Table 2 presents a brief description of the socioeconomic conditions prevailing in the ten pilot municipalities. These locales have very low levels of economic development and income, high levels of poverty, and high adolescent fertility rates. As Table 2 shows, the average tax collection per capita per year between 2016 and 2019 in the ten pilot municipalities is 106,000 Colombian pesos (about 30 USD). In contrast, this figure is almost 85 percent higher in the average rural municipality in Colombia, and the figure is more than 4.5 times higher for the entire country. As research conducted in Colombia suggests, the presence of armed groups could be associated with different levels of taxation at the municipal level (Ch et

al., 2018). The percentage of the population of these ten municipalities with unmet basic needs (a measure of extreme poverty) is 34 percent; for all rural municipalities in Colombia, it is slightly lower (30 percent); finally, for all municipalities in Colombia, it is only 14 percent.

In addition, Table 2 depicts the average monetary poverty index, which measures the percentage of the population living in poverty. The ten pilot municipalities are not very different from the rest of the country's rural municipalities (approximately 49 percent), yet the figure is 26 percent for all municipalities in Colombia. Education coverage, which in the country is quite broad, is 83.4 percent in the pilot municipalities, very close to that of other rural municipalities (84 percent) and slightly lower than the country average (89 percent). These socioeconomic indicators, obtained from the municipal panel of the Center for Studies on Economic Development of the Department of Economics of the University of the Andes, show that the ten pilot municipalities of Resilient Communities have very low levels of institutional capacity, low income levels, and very deep social and economic problems, which exacerbate the vulnerability of their populations to problems of insecurity and violence.

Table 2: Socioeconomic conditions in the ten Resilient Communities intervention municipalities (2016–2019)

Municipio	Per-cápita tax revenue (COL\$)	% of population				
		% of population in formal jobs	with unmet basic needs	Monetary poverty index	Eduaction coverage	Fertility rate for women 15-18
El Carmen De Bolívar	\$50,848	4.49	41.5	58.4	85.7	95.6
El Guamo	\$72,419	2.72	28.7	59.5	87.5	54
San Andrés De Tumaco	\$79,116	8.82	27.5	53.7	74.4	75.1
Santander De Quilichao	\$152,473	17.22	12	23.8	94.7	72
Tierralta	\$88,296	2.96	55.8	63.8	91.4	102.5
Weighted avg in 5 municipalities (Interviews)	\$92,015	8.90	31.1	50	83.2	81.6
Caucasia	\$230,435	12.46	22.1	36	81.6	110.2
Cáceres	\$76,682	2.89	49.8	66.4	72.1	62
San Jacinto	\$75,420	2.90	93.4	60.3	104.6	67.4
Sardinata	\$67,473	5.72	36.9	53.8	84.9	70.1
Valencia	\$72,063	2.79	55.9	53.1	83.6	72.7
Weighted avg in 5 municipalities (No Interviews)	\$142,441	7.40	42.2	48.4	83.7	86.8
Weighted avg in 10 municipalities	\$105,931	8.50	34.1	49.5	83.4	83
Weighted avg all rural municipalities	\$189,177	9.50	30.1	48.7	84	65.9
Weighted average all Colombian municipalities	\$478,854	27.10	14.4	26.1	89	59.1

Source: ET calculations based on information from the municipal panel of the Center for Studies on Economic Development, Department of Economics, Universidad de los Andes.

Finally, another factor that should be considered in assessing the conditions under which PADF initiated the implementation of the Resilient Communities is the COVID-19 pandemic. The broad and intense spread of COVID-19 in Colombia in both urban and rural areas coincided with the deployment of the Resilient Communities Activity, which severely disrupted the administrative, logistical, budgetary, and personnel projections of the Activity. The COVID-19 pandemic could have two distinct effects. On one hand, research conducted in other countries shows that the pandemic hindered the activity of armed groups and reduced their capacity to engage in violence (Brancati et al., 2023). As a consequence, there is a possibility that the implementation of the Resilient Communities Activity overlaps with a reduction of crime caused by the reduction of armed group activity associated with the pandemic rather than a direct effect of the Activity. On the other hand, the pandemic also opened opportunities for criminal groups to thrive (Barnes & Albarracín, 2020; Davis & Hilgers, 2022; Gomez, 2020), thus making it more difficult for the Activity to have an impact. The ET even learned that members of PADF and IPs suffered the loss of family members due to COVID-19. The ET acknowledges the remarkable resilience of the IPs' personnel and leadership to overcome the uncertainty, fear, and administrative, logistical, and budgetary challenges related to the COVID-19 pandemic while implementing the Resilient Communities Activity.

I.5 CITIZEN SECURITY POLICIES AND THE RESILIENT COMMUNITIES ACTIVITY

Resilient Communities provides an innovative approach to address citizen security by creating synergies between security institutions and civil society. Each of these two sectors often benefits from international and national efforts to improve and strengthen their capacities, but they generally do it in isolation. In contrast, Resilient Communities offers an encompassing approach to increase the communication and interaction between these sectors while enhancing their internal capacities.

On one hand, the traditional way in which security issues in rural municipalities in Colombia are managed has been quite centralist, where diagnoses, decisions, and strategies are generally designed in central government offices in Bogotá, with limited attention paid to the local communities' most pressing needs or the daily security risks affecting them and their social leaders. This vision of security is reflected in the fact that communities of rural municipalities rarely participate in the formulation of prevention and protection policies aimed at mitigating the effects of crime and violence. Beyond sporadic community councils lasting a few hours, these rural communities had very few opportunities to participate more actively in the prevention of and protection against criminal threats before Resilient Communities. In this way, the Activity helps to strengthen the responsiveness and capacity of institutions in charge of providing security.

On the other hand, Resilient Communities includes a broad range of activities focused on strengthening the capacity and social cohesion of community members, CSOs, and social leaders to operate in difficult security environments. Resilient Communities conducts these activities with the deliberate effort of including local government and security agencies to increase bonds of trust and interaction with the community. In this way, the Activity contributes to enhancing social cohesion within the community in coordination with government efforts. Under Resilient Communities, communities have had the opportunity to strengthen trust and ties with local and national authorities in charge of formulating and implementing security policies.

Resilient Communities can be an opportunity for a paradigm shift in the way local and national authorities work together with communities in the diagnosis, formulation, and implementation of security, protection, and prevention policies. For example, communities in small, rural municipalities are rarely taken into account in the formulation of the PISCC. The traditional way in which many municipalities build the PISCC is by hiring external consultants (some even financed by international cooperation resources) who,

without knowing the characteristics of the municipalities, their needs, and the security risks that they face, take pre-established and filled formats to construct the plan. With this, the local administration meets the legal requirement of formulating the PISCC, but as a consequence, the PISCC generally does not respond to the needs of the communities, is underfunded, and does not contribute to improving security conditions in these municipalities. The same can be said of prevention and protection measures to confront and mitigate the effects of violence. The implementation of Resilient Communities is a step forward not only in strengthening the ties between local authorities, the police, and communities, but also in improving social cohesion and de-escalating conflicts within the population.

2. METHODOLOGY

The midterm performance evaluation of the Resilient Communities Activity encompassed several sources of data, including a desk review of Activity documents, KIIs, and FGDs.²

2.1 SITE SELECTION

In addition to the capital city of Bogotá, the evaluation included data from five out of the ten pilot municipalities targeted by Resilient Communities. To select the five municipalities, the ET considered two criteria: **the Community Resilience Index (CRI) and security conditions on the ground.**

The ET based the first criterion on the municipal ranking of CRI scores developed by the IP. Table 3 below presents the CRI scores for the ten pilot municipalities of the Resilient Communities Activity. The CRI index ranges from 0–1, with 1 indicating greater resilience. As shown in Table 3, of the pilot intervention municipalities, Sardinata exhibited the highest CRI score (i.e., greatest level of resilience), at 0.60, and San Andrés de Tumaco exhibited the lowest CRI score at 0.25. For evaluation site selection, the ET considered a range of CRI scores to help assess the performance of Resilient Communities across different settings with distinct social and institutional characteristics. In this way, the site selection strategy allowed for identifying the conditions that may facilitate or obstruct the implementation of Resilient Communities. Lessons derived from this approach will be particularly useful to inform the expansion of Resilient Communities to other municipalities.

Table 3: Municipalities' CRI scores

CRI SCORE	RESILIENT COMMUNITIES PROJECT PILOT MUNICIPALITIES
0.60	Sardinata, Norte de Santander
0.57	Caucasia, Antioquia
0.56	San Jacinto, Bolívar
0.54	Cáceres, Antioquia
0.51	Tierralta, Córdoba*
0.47	Valencia, Córdoba
0.46	El Guamo, Bolívar*

² The ET also planned, designed, and piloted a survey of Resilient Communities participants for the evaluation, but it was discontinued due to challenges uncovered in the piloting phase. Please see Annex C for additional detail regarding the survey and the decision to discontinue survey data collection.

CRI SCORE	RESILIENT COMMUNITIES PROJECT PILOT MUNICIPALITIES
0.46	El Carmen de Bolívar, Bolívar*
0.45	Santander de Quilichao, Cauca*
0.25	San Andrés de Tumaco, Nariño*

* Selected as performance evaluation study sites.

The second criterion for evaluation site selection focused on the security conditions necessary to conduct the evaluation data collection efforts in the pilot municipalities. The ET considered several factors to assess the security conditions and the feasibility of deploying a face-to-face survey, as well as conducting interviews and focus groups. First, the ET considered the homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in 2023 as compared with 2022 as an indicator of risk of violence for the data collection team; second, the ET considered security reports about the presence of armed groups in the municipalities in 2023 as well as in municipalities nearby; finally, the ET relied on public reports of violent incidents and community problems. Based on these criteria, and in consultation with the Mission, the ET selected the five communities of Tierralta, El Guamo, El Carmen de Bolívar, Santander de Quilichao, and San Andrés de Tumaco. These municipalities cover a broad range of CRI scores from 0.25 in San Andrés de Tumaco (lower resilience) up to Tierralta with 0.51 (higher resilience).

2.2 RESPONDENT SAMPLING

The ET identified categories of proposed participants for the KIIs and FGDs through background desk research and consultations with the Mission and the IP and with the consideration of the main groups of stakeholders, beneficiaries, and community representatives for Resilient Communities. These included:

- National government: Ministry of the Interior, the CNP (N=19).
- Local government: Mayors and Secretary of Interior (N=19).
- IPs' national and regional liaisons: Pastoral Social, Caribe Afirmativo (N=23).
- CSOs: Representatives within each municipality (N=26).
- Youth, women, and LGBTQI+ representatives at the regional level (N=49).

Annex E contains more detail regarding the qualitative interviews conducted, including by municipality.³

2.3 DATA SOURCES

DESK REVIEW

As part of the background research, the ET conducted a desk review of relevant primary and secondary sources and Activity documents (e.g., Activity implementation plans; monitoring, evaluation, learning, and planning documents; organizational performance documents; methodological and training materials; reports; etc.). The desk review conducted prior to fieldwork allowed the ET to analyze the information produced by Resilient Communities in years 1 and 2. The consolidated matrix of results prepared by PADF and containing activities of the annual work plan for years 1 and 2, known as the Activity tracker,

³ Ns shown here will not be identical to the Ns shown in Annex E due to the fact that some interview participants are classified in multiple categories (e.g., women and social leaders).

facilitated the navigation across products, activities, filecards, categories, IPs, results, and subresults. This information allowed the ET to scale up the knowledge curve of the Activity, conduct an informed first round of exploratory interviews with IPs, and refine the data collection instruments. See Annex F for a summary table of desk review materials organized by EQ.

KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

The ET developed the KII and FGD topic guide in consultation with the USAID/Colombia Mission and organized it by EQ. As approved by the USAID/Colombia Mission, the ET designed 10–12 sub-questions for each EQ to be answered in the qualitative interviews. The topic guide helped to ensure that the interactions with stakeholders were focused and aligned with the evaluation objectives. All questions were open-ended to facilitate detailed responses. The questions began with a closed-ended statement. Based on that, participants elaborated their answers, connecting with policies related to citizen security such as health, education, infrastructure, and others. Hence, the evaluation reflects how human security is deeply intertwined with other public policies.

The KII and FGD topic guide (and survey instrument), and their associated informed consent forms, were independently reviewed and approved by Salus, a U.S.-based Institutional Review Board (IRB), as is standard practice by Cloudburst for research of this nature. Salus is a non-profit IRB accredited by the Association for the Accreditation of Human Research Protection Programs. During the KIIs and FGDs, the ET obtained informed consent verbally after reading aloud a standardized script to potential KII interviewees and FGD participants.

During the fieldwork in the five municipalities and Bogotá, the ET engaged with a diverse array of stakeholders for the KIIs, as presented below in Table 4. These stakeholders included the CNP, Ombudsman Office delegate, Ministry of the Interior representative, community-based social organizations, local government representatives, and youth beneficiaries.

Table 4: KIIs conducted by municipality

STAKEHOLDER	MUNICIPALITY						TOTAL
	El Carmen de Bolívar	Tierralta	El Guamo	Santander de Quilichao	San Andrés de Tumaco	Bogotá	
CNP	3	2	2	2	3	3	15
Community-based social organizations	2	2	2	2	3	0	11
Youth beneficiaries	2	2	2	2	2	0	10
IPs	1	2	2	1	1	7	14
Local government	2	2	2	2	2	3	13
Total	10	10	10	9	11	13	63

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

The National Consulting Center (Centro Nacional de Consultoría—CNC) conducted all the FGDs within the five municipalities, often in the local community centers. Table 5 below presents the number of FGDs conducted in each municipality. Various stakeholders participated in these FGDs, representing a diverse spectrum; these included community members, local government officials, and beneficiaries. The data collection process was highly interactive and engaging. The methodology focused on a participatory workshop involving an average of six participants in each FGD. The discussions lasted up to 180 minutes and relied on a variety of social inquiry techniques such as brainstorming, coming up with questions for opinion sharing, and interactive activities. To facilitate the activity, each FGD included a moderator, a logistical support person, and a designated note-taker, each with specific roles. This approach helped to create an open conversation environment within a dynamic setting that encouraged collective construction.

Prior to the participants' arrival, CNC organized the space in a U-shaped layout. Participants received name tags and an attendance list, and the ET obtained informed consent verbally. As individuals provided their insights and perspectives, the ET systematically recorded the information on posters, flashcards, and audio recordings. This approach facilitated the unfolding of meaningful discussions and allowed the ET to effectively document key points, thus helping the participants collectively build a comprehensive narrative during the evaluation process.

Table 5: FGDs conducted by municipality

	MUNICIPALITY						TOTAL
	El Carmen de Bolívar	Tierralta	El Guamo	Santander de Quilichao	San Andrés de Tumaco	Bogotá	
Number of FGDs	3	3	3	3	3	N/A	15
Number of FGD participants	13	19	21	21	14	N/A	88

2.4 DATA COLLECTION

Data collection was conducted from August 8 to September 8, 2023. The qualitative team lead traveled to Bogotá to conduct in-person interviews and train the Colombian data collection firm, CNC. CNC was selected through a competitive Request for Proposal (RFP) process and led FGDs and KIIs in the selected municipalities.

CNC experts led KII data collection in El Carmen de Bolívar from August 8 to 11 and two virtual interviews. The team conducted El Guamo's data collection in person from August 22 to 25, with one virtual interview on August 30. In Santander de Quilichao, the ET conducted KIIs between August 28 and 31 in person. The team collected San Andrés de Tumaco's data in person between August 28 and 31, with virtual interviews on August 31 and September 5 and 8. The team collected Tierralta's data in person from August 22 to 25, with additional virtual interviews on August 31, and September 1 and 6. The interviews had an estimated duration of 45 to 60 minutes and, when agreed upon in the informed consent process, were recorded.

In each municipality, the ET carried out three different FGDs. In parallel to the KIIs, the FGD took place in El Carmen de Bolívar from August 8 to 11. The team collected El Guamo's and Tierralta's data in person from August 22 to 25. The team collected Santander de Quilichao and San Andrés de Tumaco FGD data between August 28 and 31.

2.5 DATA ANALYSIS

The qualitative data collection process followed an information quality protocol, which included procedures such as ensuring that the instruments were optimal for the target population and appropriate to the local language(s), were understandable to respondents in the Colombian context, and technically appropriate for the research questions and implementation team. After completing the qualitative fieldwork, the ET also conducted outbrief sessions with the CNC facilitators to gather their insights about data collection in the municipalities.

The ET organized every KII and FGD transcript in an individual MS Word file for content analysis, then analyzed interview responses using a coding schema in Excel organized by every EQ and sub-EQ. This allowed the ET to classify all the data from all interview participants by municipality and explore the nuances in the responses across the stakeholder categories. FGD responses were also similarly organized and coded in Excel by EQ/sub-EQ.

The qualitative team conducted content analysis to find matching categories in every other subquestion by municipality. These dense descriptions were summarized considering the most relevant hubs to answer the EQ. The findings, conclusions, and recommendations section (organized by EQ) reflect the main hubs during the evaluation expressed by the actors in the five municipalities. The ET was particularly careful to highlight situations that were not significant across all municipalities but were important findings nonetheless (e.g., information leaks, special situations for LGBTQI+ Indigenous citizens, among others). Additionally, some of the interview participants gave direct inputs for recommendations.

2.6 LIMITATIONS

The original methodology proposed for the Resilient Communities evaluation used a mixed-methods design to examine Activity outcomes in the first two years of implementation. The original research design included a combination of desk-based research, KIIs, FGDs, and a quantitative survey focused on Activity beneficiaries. Data from the pilot survey in late August revealed a number of issues related to the database of Activity beneficiaries—for example, an insufficient sample of beneficiaries in the study areas with valid contact information—as well as low recall rates regarding the Resilient Communities intervention among beneficiaries that the ET interviewed in the pilot survey. USAID, in consultation with the ET, the survey firm CNC, Cloudburst, and PADF, determined that the quantitative survey was not feasible and that the evaluation should only focus on the qualitative data collected in the five study municipalities as well as Bogotá.

Without the survey, the midterm evaluation must rely on primary qualitative data alone (in addition to the desk review findings). This constitutes a limitation in answering some elements of the six EQs. For example, without quantitative data, the ET is unable to answer “to what extent”-type questions, and instead must focus on the “how” questions. For instance, under EQ1—*How and to what extent has Resilient Communities contributed to police responsiveness and community relations?*—the evaluation uses rich qualitative data related to the perceptions of stakeholders about how Resilient Communities has contributed to police responsiveness and legitimacy, as well as challenges and opportunities. These findings are not necessarily generalizable across all Resilient Communities Activity areas, and the ET is unable to quantitatively answer “to what extent” police responsiveness and community relations have improved.

See Annex C for more details regarding the limitations experienced in the quantitative and qualitative data collection.

As discussed in the Background and Context section, the pilot municipalities suffer endemic security challenges. In addition, the midterm evaluation faced specific challenges derived from a recent escalation of non-state armed actors' activity in some pilot municipalities. The territorial expansion of some of these non-state armed actors prevented the ET from gaining safe access to some municipalities to directly conduct research related to the midterm evaluation. The literature on rebel and criminal governance consistently indicates that high levels of territorial control by armed groups allows them to implement effective mechanisms to regulate community dynamics, including who is allowed to enter and operate in the territory (Anders, 2020; Arjona, 2016; Kalyvas, 2006; Lessing, 2020). In the context of this midterm evaluation, the ET learned that the National Liberation Army expanded its territorial presence in several municipalities in an effort to increase its bargaining power at the negotiation tables with the Colombian Government as part of "Total Peace" (*Paz Total*) efforts conducted by the government. PADF and its IPs were very diligent and collaborative in sharing with the ET timely information about security conditions on the ground. For the set of municipalities where security conditions were permissive to conduct research, PADF was very collaborative with the ET in order to evaluate the security conditions in the territories. Fortunately, there were no security challenges in the sample municipalities during the evaluation.⁴

3. EQI. CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICE RESPONSIVENESS AND COMMUNITY RELATIONS

EQI. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy that contributes to police providing responsive services to communities and to a more legitimate, trustworthy, and responsive relationship between police and communities? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities?

3.1 FINDINGS

As indicated by Sonnenfeld et al. (2023), despite experiencing the largest share of violent and property crimes, relatively few rigorous evaluations of citizen security programs have been conducted in low- and middle-income countries when compared to high-income countries. The need to identify effective citizen security initiatives for developing countries is particularly urgent given recent experimental research conducted in multiple developing countries indicating that community policing, a type of citizen security strategy, is not effective in increasing trust in the police or reducing crime (Blair et al., 2021). However, the evidence for Colombia shows that the implementation of community policing in Colombia through Plan Cuadrantes led to significant reductions in crime (García et al., 2013). Assessing Resilient Communities, and how it contributes to police responsiveness and community relations, contributes to this small, but growing, evidence base about citizen security programs in the developing world.

⁴ The only heightened security situation that occurred was in Tierralta, when PADF alerted the ET to avoid conducting interviews in cafés to protect the beneficiaries, which the ET immediately heeded.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICE RESPONSIVENESS, LEGITIMACY, AND TRUSTWORTHINESS

Overall, activity participants interviewed for this midterm evaluation reported that the Resilient Communities strategy has generally improved dialogue with and trust between the police and community members, and therefore contributed to improved social cohesion in implementing areas. Seventy percent of Resilient Communities beneficiaries interviewed reported that the community's perception of security due to the services provided by the National Police has improved.⁵ Interview participants cited improvements in the police's willingness to listen to community needs, expanded communication, and increased trust and legitimacy.

Marginalized groups: Interview participants reported that the Activity's co-design of protection plans is informed by and tailored to the needs of marginalized groups, including women, Indigenous communities, rural communities, and the LGBTQI+ population. Women, especially those in urban areas, reported feeling more listened to.

"Before, it was very difficult for a person to have the confidence to make a complaint, to call the police to support them to take care of a situation, because they thought that when they called the police, the perpetrator would find out, so there was no confidence. But it has improved because now, for example, in the case of women, we dare to denounce, to speak out, we manage a gender table within the justice committee, and there, the women leaders can express themselves, they go to the public forces, so it has improved a lot."

Local government, Carmen de Bolívar, 08/23.

In parallel with women's greater voice, more attention is now being paid to violence against women and the ongoing structural challenges of gender violence within the male-dominated cultural context.

In addition, interview participants noted improved relationships and trust between the LGBTQI+ community and the police:

"Yes, I feel that people do feel safe, because years ago there was disrespect against LGBTQ people, they were not accepted, there was a lot of bullying, but now the police support is noticeable. We as women feel safe with the work of the police, I say it and I have evidence, because there have been intra-family problems, and if we have called the police, they have intervened in the most polite way and we have seen the result."

CSO, El Guamo, 08/23.

Youth: Youth also reported positively regarding their inclusion in the Resilient Communities strategy, and their participation—for the first time—in this citizen security initiative. Interview participants reported that, through Resilient Communities activities such as cleaning parks and beautifying community areas, the ties between youth and the police, and between youth and the larger community, have been strengthened, particularly in urban areas.

Interview participants, including participants from local government, police, and social organizations, also highlighted the many challenges facing youth in these communities, including the availability of narcotics, the influence of micro-trafficking networks, and the economic and social incentives to join illegal armed groups. These factors contribute to youth's feelings of stigmatization and the associated excessive use of

⁵ KII Form EQ1, PEI responses in the five municipalities. See Annex D.

force and mistreatment by the police. Finally, interview participants also highlighted the lack of recreational spaces and activities, educational opportunities, and employment opportunities, all of which contribute to a context of excess free time among youth, which they cited as a key risk factor in the territories. In cases such as Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco, and Tierralta, excess free time among youth was identified as a contributor to forced recruitment by illegal armed groups.

“Yes, there has been change. The Somos Comunidad program has promoted dialogue and effective communication between the community and the police, fostering an environment of trust and mutual learning. There has been a noticeable positive change in the relationship with the police, with less violence and more support from the community. Previously, people were afraid to approach the police because of their aggressive attitude and lack of responsiveness, but now they feel they can communicate and receive help effectively.”

Youth, Carmen de Bolívar, 08/23.

BOTTLENECKS AND CHALLENGES

Rural disadvantage: The evaluation’s qualitative data also uncovered several bottlenecks or challenges related to police responsiveness and community relations. For example, while interview participants reported greater police responsiveness and improvements in the relationship between the community and the police overall, this finding was more pronounced in urban areas; rural areas experience more limited police capacity and associated responsiveness. In rural areas in particular, the qualitative data indicated communities’ general preference to maintain a certain distance from the public forces as a self-protection mechanism and to avoid possible reprisals from armed groups. Some interview participants mentioned that some individuals in rural areas fear and comply with the informal norms imposed by illegal armed groups (Tierralta and Tumaco). In parallel, interviews with police indicated that the regional security context prevents them from reaching some of the most dispersed rural areas.

Police turnover: Additionally, high police turnover undermines relationship-building and trust in the police. Interview participants noted that, as a consequence of high personnel turnover in the CNP, new police officers rotating into Resilient Communities intervention municipalities were not properly trained in differential approaches to vulnerable populations and the risks these populations face. Thus the police responsiveness “learning curve”—which has contributed to closer community ties and improved trust and legitimacy—is lost after each redeployment.

Interview participants also described how information leaks attributed to the police greatly undermine community trust and potentially put community members at risk of harm from reprisals (Tierralta and Tumaco).⁶

Finally, qualitative interviews with police indicated that the police often feel alone in shouldering citizen security and broader state-building. In particular, interviews indicated that police often do not perceive clear and committed support from local governments. For example, for the police to patrol the rural areas of the prioritized municipalities, articulation with the armed forces is required due to the difficult security contexts. The police are not reaching these areas and the populations report feeling abandoned.

⁶ The qualitative data revealed two instances in which the perceived relationship with the police led to risky situations for the community. After issuing a formal complaint to the police, a leader in Santander de Quilichao stated that the community singled her out as an informant (labeled as a “snitch”) because she was talking to CNP. In El Carmen de Bolívar, the police arrested several individuals in the same neighborhood where Resilient Communities recently implemented an activity. As a result of the police raid, the population was accused of collaborating with the police.

OPPORTUNITIES

Training: Resilient Communities' training initiatives within the CNP are viewed very positively and are effective, but are not yet comprehensive throughout the police. Participants reported that trained police better respond to community needs and are more respectful. Yet this training is not available to all relevant police personnel. Only the strategy liaisons of the Resilient Communities Activity, the commander, and selected police officers receive Resilient Communities information. Since only a portion of the police is trained in Resilient Communities principles and tactics, there are coordination gaps in information handling, differential treatment of the population, and a lack of tact in the handling of sensitive information (related to the information leaks mentioned above).

Youth: Expanding and deepening the inclusion of youth in Resilient Communities activities is an opportunity to amplify the Activity's effects. As youth disproportionately face many of the greatest challenges (drug consumption and trafficking; illegal armed group recruitment; a dearth of recreation, education, and employment opportunities; etc.), strengthening their participation in Resilient Communities is vitally important in and of itself and also presents an opportunity to amplify Resilient Communities' reach.

Rural areas: Rural areas present particular opportunities for more targeted and innovative approaches to deepen police responsiveness due to factors such as the challenging security context, remoteness of rural communities/limited state presence, and community relationships, which the qualitative data indicated were stronger in urban areas than in rural areas of the Resilient Communities intervention. Indeed, the perception of the national police correlates to the quality of infrastructure (e.g., roads) in the municipalities and the strength of local institutions (e.g., health, education, security). As documented in the literature, this is a common challenge for developing countries in which the state has limited institutional capacity in remote areas (O'Donnell, 1993; Scott, 2010).

3.2 CONCLUSIONS

With respect to EQ1—*How and to what extent has Resilient Communities improved police responsiveness, trust, and legitimacy?*—the ET found that the police show an increased willingness to listen and a greater responsiveness to the needs of community members, including members of disadvantaged groups. This has strengthened relationships and improved trust in and perceived legitimacy of the police.

However, the high turnover among CNP personnel undermines these relationships of trust and legitimacy as the police responsiveness “learning curve”—developed gradually between the police and the community—is lost with each re-deployment. Indeed, a common challenge in public administration is the temporary decline of public services following the turnover of bureaucrats as part of electoral or political cycles (Akhtari et al., 2022), a challenge that also affects law enforcement agencies (Hilal & Litsey, 2020). Due to the complex security conditions in Colombia and the characteristics of the CNP, it may not be feasible to reduce the rotation of police personnel. However, experimental research conducted in other countries suggests that improving training and rotation procedures serve to improve police performance while still maintaining personnel rotation (Banerjee et al., 2021).

In general, the ET found that efforts to increase police responsiveness are in line with innovative approaches in police training emphasizing the importance of psychological skills and environmental awareness tools (Bennell et al., 2022; Blumberg et al., 2019). In particular, the evidence gathered in the qualitative analysis of the midterm evaluation is consistent with findings of improving relationships resulting from active listening training (Kluger & Itzchakov, 2022; Weger et al., 2014). Applying these active listening skills to law enforcement agents has shown improvements in police-community relationships based on a better understanding of the community's needs by law enforcement agents (Wood et al., 2020).

3.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

PADF should implement a “train-the-trainers” program for the CNP so that the group champions and disseminates the Resilient Communities approach more broadly within the police. A train-the-trainers model would help imbed knowledge within the CNP and reduce challenges related to turnover and transfers within the municipal police departments.

PADF should modify the CNP training to emphasize inclusivity, particularly how the police can serve as a source of legitimacy in marginalized communities. In particular, training should emphasize how to work with LGBTQI+ populations, women, victims, ethnic groups, and youth affairs and their role as a source of legitimacy in the communities. Although marginalized communities’ perception of police has improved, mistrust and low legitimacy still persist—especially in rural areas of municipalities where violence by armed groups is more frequent—and additional training aimed at these communities would advance the Activity’s goals.

PADF should better coordinate with local administrations and the CNP to minimize duplication of efforts. For example, Resilient Communities began working on drug use prevention in Tumaco at the same time that the municipality was carrying out training with youth, duplicating efforts that could have been better coordinated. Before starting interventions in the municipalities, better coordination between actors, including a review of existing and upcoming programming, would allow them to leverage existing initiatives and not duplicate or make parallel efforts.

4. EQ2: CONTRIBUTIONS TO CVP AND IBPS

EQ2. To what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy to support CVP and IBPs that is based on evidence and is responsive to community needs? Has the strategy contributed to communities appropriating measures from supported CVPs and IBPs and to a positive perception of their effectiveness? How?

4.1 FINDINGS

The Resilient Communities strategy to support CVP and IBPs is rooted in a co-creation process with local communities to develop a concrete set of actions identified to enhance social cohesion and promote risk prevention. At the start of 2023, the Resilient Communities Activity had forty initiatives across all municipalities on issues including social cohesion, psychosocial support, and gender-based violence prevention. The CVP process reveals the salience of critical community issues that were not previously considered as citizen security problems, such as violence against women, abuse, discrimination against the LGBTQI+ population, adolescents' unstructured free time, and psychoactive drug use.

Desk research shows that the CVP and IBPs are rooted in an evidence-based approach and align with guidelines focused on reducing gender bias for victims of domestic or sexual violence (International Association of Chiefs of Police, 2021; US Department of Justice, 2015), improving relations with LGBTQI+ communities (Miraglia, 2016; Out to Protect, 2010; Queens Youth Justice Center, 2016), and enhancing police-youth engagement (International Association of Chiefs of Police, n.d., 2020).

One of the most impactful CVPs mentioned by FGDs was a closing activity on the themes of prevention of psychoactive drug consumption and social coexistence, carried out in Santander de Quilichao by

Pastoral Social. This activity included a cultural show that involved Afro-Colombian traditional music teachers and allowed the activity to be positively appropriated by the population and adapted to their cultural and emotional needs, especially for the young population. Women and LGBTQI+ CVP/IBPs were also noted by respondents as particularly impactful at increasing beneficiaries' community management capacity and their interrelation with institutions.

COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF CVP AND IBP EFFECTIVENESS

One hundred percent of the directly interviewed beneficiaries perceived the implementation of the CVP and IBP strategies as positive.⁷ Beneficiaries emphasize their involvement in the design of these activities and thus consider them articulated to their needs. However, multiple FGD participants noted a desire for CVP interactions to be longer-term to better help communities achieve their goals.

CSOs: CSOs who were direct beneficiaries of Resilient Communities have a positive opinion of the Activity. They credit Resilient Communities CVP and IBPs for the strengthening of their organizations, the visibility they gained with local institutions, and the training that increased their community management capacity and their interrelation with institutions. For the CSOs, support from Pastoral Social transformed them positively and strengthened their ability to link with the local state institutions (see EQ3). Despite the complex security situation in rural areas, CSOs have a positive view of the police and institutional response. CSO members recognize that they have been privileged by the strategy and see the need to transmit information about the Activity more effectively and recommend that they be provided with continuous and updated information to achieve a more significant impact.

Youth: Youth were a key constituency of the CVP and IBP strategy. KIIs with local governments consider that the CVP strategy was fundamental to prevent youth recruitment into armed groups and to effectively integrate them into society. During qualitative interviews, youth were the least likely to recall their participation in the Activity. Youth who remember the activities mention having danced, painted, and participated in sessions on how to be influencers but do not necessarily remember the purpose of their participation in those spaces nor the impact of the Activity. Most youth reported feeling glad to be included as part of the strategy and highlighted it as innovative that they were listened to in order to understand their needs—but some participants pointed out that "there is no clarity about the objectives, strategies, limits, or scope of the program" and "the intervention of the program was too fleeting and did not leave much of a mark on the community." There was also some confusion about what the Resilient Communities would or would not deliver. For example, youth in Tumaco recounted promises of cameras to develop their content but instead received tripods and expressed disappointment about this perceived unfulfilled promise. However, in the CVP form, it is evident that the provision of cameras was never part of the planning process. Other youth said they were promised a radio station as part of the social intervention strategy, but it did not come to fruition.

4.2 CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the CVP and IBP efforts to bridge government agencies with highly vulnerable sectors of the population is a successful strategy for meeting the Activity objectives. The most effective part of the strategy is the CVP's and IBPs' focus on highly vulnerable populations, particularly women, the LGBTQI+ community, social leaders, Indigenous people, and youth. This focus is unique among other state and donor activities. All stakeholders viewed the CVPs and IBPs as responsive to their needs. However, the evaluation did not find any evidence of communities appropriating measures from supported CVPs and IBPs at this stage of the Activity.

⁷ KII form EQ2, PE4 responses in the five municipalities. See Annex D.

4.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

Resilient Communities should increase the length of the CVP and IBP intervention to increase the impact and sustainability for communities. A sustained follow-up strategy would allow the IP to disseminate and reinforce key concepts, listen and adapt to the evolving needs of Activity participants, and track longer-term changes and investments based on the CVP. A longer implementation timeline would also allow deeper trust and relationship building between the Activity and participants.

Resilient Communities should continue to utilize attractive media tailored to targeted populations. The variety of media used in the workshops (dances, painting, influencers) made CVP and IBP initiatives engaging and effective. The Activity should continue to use these tools and be sure to make better cultural and differential readings of the targeted population, especially youth and Indigenous communities.

5. EQ3. ADVANCEMENTS IN SOCIAL COHESION

EQ3. To what extent has the methodology implemented by Resilient Communities, through local subgrantee Pastoral Social, been comprehensive and effective in advancing social cohesion in target communities?

5.1 FINDINGS

STRATEGIES FOR ADVANCING SOCIAL COHESION

Qualitative interviews from the Activity's midterm performance evaluation indicate Pastoral Social's particular success in facilitating opportunities for stakeholder groups to express their needs and therefore promote individual and community development. This has improved the social cohesion of beneficiaries, including ethnic communities, LGBTQI+, and women. The inclusion of differential approaches by Pastoral Social allowed for more visibility of problems in each territory and facilitated the identification of priority issues for the communities in the design of the PISCCs and the sensitization of the CNP trainings.

Multi-level impact: Participants feel that the Pastoral Social methodology has had a comprehensive impact—at the individual (leaders), community (CSOs), institutional, and structural levels. Actors at all levels who have worked with Pastoral Social recount very positive recollections of the professionals with whom they interacted, the treatment they received, and the impacts they had (Guamo, Tierralta, Carmen de Bolívar). Pastoral Social's strategy allowed for the reactivation of community practices and knowledge that have been lost generationally—for example, *mingas* and community cooperation, ancestral health practices, care of the environment, and musical practices and traditional dances—to combat the negative cultural effects of drug trafficking and violence (Tumaco).

CSOs: Interview data indicate that the CSOs in the intervention areas feel that they now have effective tools (e.g., women's roundtables, development plans, PISCCs) to intervene assertively in local bodies. Communities report improved coordination and organization through this strengthening of CSOs. Previously, interviewees reported, CSOs were typically isolated, but now through the work of Resilient Communities via Pastoral Social, there is greater cohesion and structure due to the training they have received. In addition, the CSOs reported Pastoral Social's efficient and transparent management practices (Guamo, Tierralta, and Santander de Quilichao). Likewise, interviews with representatives from entities

such as the Ombudsman's Office, the Inspector General's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and CNP also highlighted Pastoral Social's approach and effectiveness.

"Pastoral Social has strengthened us as an organization because we have created an action plan and protection routes. It gave us several evaluation tools so that we can measure and keep track of each process that we carry out throughout our organization, such as minutes, attendance, and documents."

CSO, *El Guamo*, 08/23.

COMMUNITY PERCEPTIONS OF PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS IN ADVANCING SOCIAL COHESION

The evaluation's qualitative data reveals that communities view Pastoral Social very positively for its active involvement with the communities (Guamo, Carmen de Bolívar, and Tierralta). The communities recognize its legitimacy as a mediating and empathetic actor. In the qualitative interview data, 100 percent of the interviewees reported that the methodology implemented by Resilient Communities via Pastoral Social has been effective in promoting community integration.⁸

The listening capacity of the Pastoral Social professionals stands out, and the methodology is perceived as a highly participatory and horizontal exercise and not a "top-down" imposition. The staff is well trained and sensitive to social issues, and they employ easy-to-understand language, using examples from everyday situations and playful tools.

Indeed, the interview data indicate that Pastoral Social is viewed as the actor with the greatest legitimacy of all the IPs in the strategy. Through its methodology, Pastoral Social has made itself a bridge connecting the needs of the people and decision-makers by empowering the voice of the communities; presenting documents to local authorities; and influencing plans, programs, and participation roundtables.

Marginalized communities: Interview participants particularly highlighted Pastoral Social's attention to the **LGBTQI+** population in various communities, in alliance with *Caribe Afirmativo*. This has helped give the LGBTQI+ community visibility and has improved the integration of previously marginalized segments of society in community-strengthening exercises. Since the strategy started, there has been greater sensitivity to, more appropriate treatment of, and less stigma toward the LGBTQI+ population, and it is thus intervening in structural problems of *machismo* and discrimination in rural areas of the Atlantic Coast (Tierralta, Carmen).

In addition to LGBTQI+, Pastoral Social's interventions with **women** through workshops and support for marches and community initiatives were also highlighted by interview participants. Pastoral Social emphasizes the cohesion achieved in the community through these actions and integrating gender considerations into daily life. Eighty percent of interview participants reported that Pastoral Social's strategy fosters social cohesion and community safety in the territories.⁹

Pastoral Social's respect for **religious beliefs** and affinities and openness to the entire population has further cemented its reputation as a legitimate and trustworthy actor to turn to. Likewise, the consolidation of safe meeting spaces (e.g., "Casa de la Mujer Empoderada," Santander de Quilichao), allows

⁸ KII form EQ3, PE2 responses in the five municipalities. See Annex D.

⁹ KII form EQ3, PE4 responses in the five municipalities. See Annex D.

Pastoral Social to talk with the community and provide them with the security that they may not have in their localities.

5.2 CONCLUSIONS

Overall, the protection strategy implemented by Pastoral Social has been methodologically solid and highly participatory, engaging Activity beneficiaries and previously marginalized groups, including ethnic communities, LGBTQI+, and women. It has helped define problems and facilitated the identification of priority issues for intervention communities. The strategy was designed based on evidence from primary and secondary sources and implemented by knowledgeable facilitators familiar with the realities in the territories. For these reasons, the ET found that Pastoral Social methodology is a comprehensive and effective approach to advancing social cohesion in targeted communities.

5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

PADF should further leverage the effectiveness of Pastoral Social by expanding the number of beneficiary CSOs. Increasing the number of CSOs supported by Pastoral Social across Resilient Communities Activity areas would expand the reach of this highly effective organization, creating further synergies with CSOs and promoting community integration. At the same time, further incorporating a youth-specific focus into Pastoral Social's ongoing work, and targeting youth participants in the broadest possible range of activities (while recognizing the intersectionality of youth with other marginalized groups), would help address the concerns raised by many evaluation respondents about youth as a critically vulnerable and important stakeholder group.

PADF/Pastoral Social should adapt the violence tracker into Emberá toward strengthening the training of the Indigenous Guard on issues such as the management of domestic violence cases and stigmatization of the LGBTQI+ population. Adapting tools such as the "Violentómetro" (violence tracker) to the Emberá language to facilitate the understanding and empowerment of the population in these communities is vital. The ET recommends that Pastoral Social engage with experts in Emberá cultural management to develop a differential approach.¹⁰

6. EQ4. COMMUNITY PROTECTION

EQ4. To what extent has the Resilient Communities strategy to support protection at the community level been implemented as planned and been effective in reducing risk factors? How has the strategy responded and adapted to the needs of social leaders and ethnic organizations?

6.1 FINDINGS

Although, as discussed above in the Limitations section, the lack of quantitative data for the midterm evaluation prevents answering "to what extent"-type questions in a quantitative or generalizable way, the qualitative data collected for the evaluation indicate that the Resilient Communities strategy has been effective in reducing risk factors. In particular, community-level protection tools were cited by interview participants as especially effective, and the Activity's differential approach facilitates assessing the different

¹⁰ For example, as Pastoral Social interview participants noted, limitations in the interpretation of risk by the Emberá community make them more vulnerable to risks, highlighting the importance of a targeted approach.

risks affecting groups such as women, ethnic groups, LGBTQI+ community. The sexual- and gender-differentiated approaches of the strategy design have made it possible to assess disparate risks and design mechanisms according to the needs of each territory.

“The project has been essential in terms of self-protection and relationship [building], management, and advocacy with the institutions. When we started, there was not even a real notion that we were part of an organization and that we had these rights and that we are entitled by law. Now that we are empowered, I feel that we now have the capacity to relate, to manage, and to influence institutions and key actors.”

CSO, Tierralta, 08/23.

EFFECTIVENESS AT REDUCING RISK FACTORS

Qualitative interviews with Activity stakeholders indicate that the Resilient Communities strategy is effective in reducing risk factors, particularly the community-level protection tools for prioritized population groups. Interviewees described how the risk mapping process serves to identify problems in their own communities toward designing protection protocols based on those needs. All of the interviewees in the qualitative data (100 percent) reported that they know the risk factors of their communities. Those inputs become part of the PISCCs through the accompaniment of the strategy. Respondents highlighted in particular knowledge of the care route for women victims of violence (i.e., the “purple line”), the implementation of Law 1801/2016, and collaboration with grassroots organizations as positive factors.

ADAPTATIONS TO COMMUNITY NEEDS

The collective and differential protection protocol brought rural communities closer, especially those with an Indigenous and Afro-ethnic approach, significantly reducing risks (Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco). The strategy has also focused on ensuring that leadership does not fall on individuals but on organizations, and this has led the prioritized communities to participate in training spaces to strengthen community ties and create a more cohesive social fabric.

Despite these community protection successes, security threats to leaders, LGBTQI+, Afro Colombians, and Indigenous populations persist in the Activity areas, particularly Tumaco and Tierralta. Security in the rural areas of the evaluation municipalities has deteriorated. In Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco, and Tierralta, the situation is especially critical. Indigenous leaders, especially in remote areas, continue to receive threats. In these areas, there is a presence of illegal armed groups and a lack of presence of authorities (Tumaco and Tierralta).

The security context, particularly in rural areas, contributes to the perception that Resilient Communities has strengthened self-protection mechanisms in urban communities, but rural communities are remote and self-protection is inadequate without greater institutional support (Tumaco and Tierralta). For example, in Tumaco, four armed groups recently called a truce and this lowered the level of conflict, but there is little state presence in the areas where the community councils are located. In Tierralta, the lack of people who know the Emberá culture impedes the greater appropriation of the strategy by this Indigenous community.

In this context of insecurity, the Resilient Communities strategy has also been effective in raising awareness that security is dependent on community strengthening. Initiatives such as community Whatsapp groups and meetings to discuss risks were highlighted as effective individual self-protection mechanisms. However, self-protection is insufficient if it is not institutionally supported.

In the qualitative interviews, communities expressed concern about the end of the Resilient Communities Activity because the strategy is considered a communication bridge between communities and local governments. In addition, the political will to support the Activity by the mayors' offices is often inadequate. Recurrent turnover in the local administration means that the IPs need to regularly sensitize local bureaucrats about the Resilient Communities Activity. However, the extent of support of the mayors' offices to the Resilient Communities activities primarily rests on political will. The effectiveness of Resilient Communities for the protection of the community depends on the visibility of the needs of the communities to advocate in institutional scenarios (victims' roundtables, women's roundtables) and include them in the planning instruments (development plans, PISCCs). In this sense, the support of the mayors' offices, although not always obtained, is fundamental for the success of the Activity and depends critically on constant visibility, management, and dialogue. This challenge is particularly relevant in the context of the upcoming municipal elections.

6.2 CONCLUSIONS

The ET found that the Resilient Communities strategy has supported community protection by improving the identification of risks through community risk mapping tailored to specific groups, especially women, youth, ethnic groups, and LGBTQI+ communities. In parallel, however, security, particularly in rural areas, has deteriorated, and underlying structural factors—beyond the scope and reach of the Resilient Communities Activity alone—also contribute to this security context. Effectively addressing structural risk factors requires a broad engagement of government agencies, particularly at the local level. Communities realize that building trust to reduce risk factors takes time, yet participants perceived that intervention times were short and logistical and administrative procedures were lengthy (e.g., youth in Carmen de Bolívar reported that the intervention with them lasted less than three months).

6.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

PADF should improve coordination between the Resilient Communities Activity and local institutions in Tumaco and Tierralta, two of the locales with the most critical security conditions. CNP would benefit from a better understanding of the Resilient Communities Activity. PADF should review the plans, programs, and activities implemented by CNP to better harmonize activities with the communities.

PADF should update risk maps while taking into consideration youth as a highly vulnerable and critical group. Similarly, the ET recommends updating the risk map of the Embera community in Tierralta by engaging people knowledgeable of the Indigenous communities and their language to transmit and adapt the protection tools.

PADF should continue to raise awareness about Resilient Communities among new mayors. The ET recommends PADF and IPs update the risk maps, participate in the construction and socialization of the new municipal development plans, and take part in the debates in the municipal councils. PADF could take part in the updates of the PISCCs and socialize the methodologies, primers, and batteries of indicators with the new administrations to encourage their use. In this sense, the products produced by Resilient Communities could be delivered as a sort of "toolbox" to the new administrations.

7. EQ5. STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND ENABLING ENVIRONMENT

EQ5. How is the Resilient Communities strategy engaging with the most relevant institutional stakeholders and enabling the environment for effective, responsive, and actionable protection strategies? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities in this process?

7.1 FINDINGS

STAKEHOLDER ENGAGEMENT AND ENABLING ENVIRONMENT STRATEGY

The Resilient Communities strategy has been effective in the relationship with relevant institutional actors of the local security systems (mayors' offices, government secretariats, police) and with strategic partners (secretariats of economic development, culture, health, and family). At the national level, the relationship with CNP, the Ombudsman's Office, the Inspector General's Office, and the Ministry of the Interior is noteworthy. The strategy has articulated actions that have allowed joint workshops in which people seek solutions to their needs (filing complaints and requesting services). The articulation of the Resilient Communities Activity in the National Guarantees Board stands out as a space where violence against women is visible. Here, the Impulse Committee has been fundamental, where Resilient Communities has cooperated with the Ministry of the Interior for the cases of Montes de María (Guamo and Carmen). The Ministry of the Interior recognizes the Activity's capacity as an interlocutor between the community and the institutions to transmit risk situations and guarantee visibility and impact on public policy.

Resilient Communities is "a key actor with firm feet in the territory and that is key for any process of implementation of a national policy" (Ministry of the Interior). The Human Rights Directorate of the Inspector General's Office emphasizes that the Resilient Communities Activity played a significant role in the development of CONPES 4063/2021, which aimed to protect and promote the work of social leaders. This effort facilitated the convening of national entities in Córdoba where the needs of the community were heard through PADF (the Human Rights Directorate of the Inspector General's Office).

The evaluation data indicated that communities are more empowered to express their needs effectively through direct communication and the presentation of formal community documents to institutions. This facilitates community advocacy to scale risk assessments and the implementation of protection measures, especially in remote communities and ethnic groups. CSOs reported that collaboration between the Activity and institutions has resulted in effective responses to community needs.

"Resilient communities has done good work. We did not have any relationship with the institutions. Now they identify us and know where we come from, so there has been quite a good change, because the way we are now, we were not before, in the treatment, in the services, how they treat us; that is, we used to arrive and they did not give us that importance as women or as victims, but now things have changed."

CSO, El Guamo, 08/23.

BOTTLENECKS AND CHALLENGES

Police: For CNP, it has been fundamental to appropriate the tools designed by the Resilient Communities Activity, such as social cartography to map the particular risks of the zones. However, the police believe the strategy's efforts could be optimized if PADF and IPs extend to neighboring municipalities to focus efforts in neighboring areas. This would allow for stronger lobbying with the mayor's offices to expand the State's engagement in these areas. The police often feel that they have been left alone in human security issues. For example, the vulnerability of youth who are at risk of joining armed groups and lack economic, recreational, educational, psychological, and health opportunities is a problem that exceeds the capacity of the police to address alone.

Interviews with police indicated poor coordination in actions targeting youth, and in sensitive cases involving the offices of Childhood and Adolescence, Family Welfare, and the police, which leads to overly long and bureaucratic procedures for this vulnerable group. In these interventions, the leadership of local administrations and the participation of local authorities is important, but not always present. The lack of more fluid and direct communication between institutions to expedite cases and avoid loss of time and resources is emphasized as a challenge.

Qualitative data revealed a perception of wear and tear on people when they have to interact with multiple institutions and face long and complex procedures, especially when an effective response is needed in cases of minors involved in psychoactive substance consumption, domestic violence, or crimes (Guamo, Carmen). Some youth and rural participants were critical of officials for not attending to urgent cases (rape, domestic abuse) on the weekends.

Coordination and continuity: The activities implemented by PADF have provided learning, work, and recreational opportunities to the community. Interview participants believe that the strategies implemented by Resilient Communities have had a positive impact on their communities and express their desire for these activities to continue supporting youth in their search for opportunities. The participants indicated that communication and collaboration with communities and leaders has been a key factor. However, they emphasize the need to ensure continuity of the processes. Participants feel that following up on activities is important to consolidate social cohesion and citizen security. Participants mentioned that local administrations do not continue to implement the programs when PADF leaves the territory and this makes people feel that the processes are left unfinished. They mentioned that the support and coordination of strategies can be maintained by the local institutions for the progress of the communities, even when Resilient Communities can no longer provide the same level of accompaniment.

OPPORTUNITIES

Social leaders feel recognized and valued, and the community feels more comfortable expressing their needs and requesting assistance. Compared to the situation two years ago, there is a better understanding and adaptation to the needs of the community, with improved communication and responsiveness of CNP (CSO Guamo). However, social leaders do not receive remuneration for their work and face many responsibilities and challenges such as becoming a military target of illegal armed groups.

The Coexistence Code was cited for its effectiveness in improving behavior, increasing respect, and fostering greater awareness in the community based on conflict prevention; it is an educational mechanism that can promote citizen security through conflict mitigation. However, due to the lack of tools provided to the police and the lack of continuous training (needed due to high police turnover), there has been a decrease in the application of the Coexistence Code.

Qualitative interview data highlighted the linkages with other USAID-funded activities, including activities focused on strengthening human rights. These linkages have contributed to the coordinated work between

the Inspector General's Office, the Ombudsman's Office, and the Ministry of the Interior in the protection of leaders. In fact, the formalization of the Tables for Life (under Directive 002 2017 of the Inspector General's Office) stands out as an effort supported by the USAID Justice for a Sustainable Peace Program and articulated with Resilient Communities. Interviews with Pastoral Social and with Tumaco Activity beneficiaries noted that there are other USAID activities in the prioritized municipalities (e.g., resilient youth, responsible governance, ethnic gathering); although they have similarities in the target population or themes, they do not yet seem to be coordinated with Resilient Communities (Pastoral and Tumaco beneficiaries).

7.2 CONCLUSIONS

The Resilient Communities Activity has been effective in engaging with relevant institutional actors of the local security system and with strategic partners at the national level, building communication channels with the institutions and generating spaces for dialogue and decision-making articulated with social organizations that did not exist before the strategy. What particularly stands out from the evaluation data includes the solid relationship at the national level with the CNP, the Ombudsman's Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the Inspector General's Office; the articulation in the National Guarantees Board about violence against women is more visible; the tools for CNP (risk mapping); and the improvement of communities' abilities to express their needs more effectively through direct communication to institutions. However, the frequent turnover of local officials leads to a loss of momentum and continuity for the Activity.

7.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

PADF should offer recurrent training opportunities for mayors' offices and local strategic partners to reduce disruptions caused by personnel turnover. The constant change of officials within the mayors' offices and police commands requires constant socialization of the strategy, informing communities about what Resilient Communities is, who the IPs are, and what activities they carry out in the territory. Enhancing the visibility of the products that PADF and the IPs have developed (protocols, policies, batteries of indicators) would help fill in the gaps affected by turnover.

USAID/Colombia should increase coordination and promote additional synergies across activities operating in the same locales. The Ombudsman's Office, the Inspector General's Office, the police, Pastoral Social, and Activity participants (Tumaco) cited synergistic opportunities across USAID activities in the territories. USAID could increase coordination between the different USAID implementers operating in the areas to help promote these synergies. Annex H presents a list of potential activities and the ET's assessment of their synergy potential with Resilient Communities.

PADF should elevate the visibility of the Resilient Communities Activity and highlight the outcomes achieved on mediation, psychosocial support, self-protection, and community strengthening in vulnerable populations. Enhanced visibility of the activities could contribute to tackling the loss of knowledge due to the regular personnel turnover within the mayors' offices and police commands.

8. EQ6: LOCAL MANAGEMENT OF CITIZEN SECURITY

EQ6. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities contributed to creating, adapting, or implementing policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, and procedures that improve local management of citizen security? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities in this process?

8.1 FINDINGS

The ET found significant evidence that Resilient Communities contributed to creating, adapting, or implementing policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, and procedures that improve local management of citizen security.

These policies include:

- The “Purple Line” (focused on women affected by situations of violence, Guamo, Tierralta).
- The Women and Gender Policy (Guamo, Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco).
- The Coexistence Code (Santander de Quilichao).
- The Public Mental Health Policy (Santander de Quilichao).
- The LGBTQI+ policy.
- The “Let's Talk about Police” dialogues.

Sixty-nine percent of the interviewees reported that Resilient Communities' strategy has improved the local management of citizen security¹¹ and 59 percent reported that citizen security is better compared to the situation two or three years ago.¹² It is noteworthy that, since the arrival of the strategy, communities turn more to the police than to illegal armed actors to resolve conflicts.

These policies improve local management of security by empowering communities to participate and advocate, making visible the needs of vulnerable populations that previously did not receive attention, reducing requests for intervention by illegal armed actors to administer justice (Tumaco, Tierralta), and improving access to government services by disseminating crucial information (resources, services available, and entities responsible). KII and FGDs revealed that the Activity has empowered communities to participate in municipal institutions, influence public management, and guide the actions of municipal entities in areas such as sexual diversity, disability, and women's rights. The work of PADF, Humanas, Pastoral Social, and Caribe Afirmativo all stand out.

“The program has contributed significantly to the creation and training of conciliators in equity, which has had a positive impact on decongestion of police inspection and conflict resolution, which in turn has improved security by helping to settle conflicts effectively.”

Local government official, Santander de Quilichao, 08/23.

The impact of the training of conciliators in equity is recognized, which has had a positive impact on the decongestion of the police inspectorate and has benefited conflict resolution and security by settling conflicts effectively (Santander de Quilichao). It should be noted that, as a result of the strategy, the

¹¹ KII form EQ6, PE1 responses in the five municipalities. See Annex D.

¹² KII form EQ6, PE4 responses in the five municipalities. See Annex D.

communities are not as frequently requesting the intervention of illegal armed groups to apply their forms of justice and are turning to the police instead (Tumaco, Tierralta). In rural areas of Colombia, it is common practice to call illegal armed actors controlling territories to mediate everyday conflicts within the communities. As a result of the training on the citizen coexistence code, the communities have been able to de-escalate the confrontations (Arjona, 2016; Urdaneta, 2017; Gonzalez et al., n.d.).

BOTTLENECKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

IPs mentioned that one of the problems identified is the frequent rotation of public officials, which delays processes and continuity in the implementation of activities and policies and the efficiency of activities (e.g., the youth liaison in El Carmen de Bolívar has been changed three times).

The Resilient Communities strategy has had a positive impact by disseminating crucial information about resources and services available to the community, as well as which entities to turn to. This has especially empowered CSOs to learn about and access government services. CSOs view the strategy as effective in making more visible the needs of vulnerable populations that previously did not receive attention (women, Indigenous people, youth, LGBTQI+). This has contributed to resolving conflicts that were left unattended due to a lack of information (Tierralta). Beneficiaries suggested that the information could have even more outreach if it is shared through community radio stations.

KIIs with police and IPs reported an opportunity for increased training in community mediation and conflict resolution. On many occasions, respondents noted that problems that can be dealt with in a communitarian manner between CSOs, community action boards (CABs), leaders, and neighbors escalate. These coexistence problems detonate new dynamics of violence when illegal armed actors are involved in resolving community situations. The importance of providing training, diplomas, or courses in reconciliation and conflict resolution is important for leaders and CABs at the municipal level. Police emphasized that this would allow the community to manage and mediate conflict situations before they escalate and require police intervention (Santander de Quilichao). Additionally, respondents recommended that training on gender violence should not only be received by women. The entire population should know how to act in situations such as these.

8.2 CONCLUSIONS

The Resilient Communities Activity was successful at creating, adapting, or implementing policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, and procedures. However, the evaluation tools did not successfully identify how the Activity did this, or any outcomes that resulted from the new policies, guidelines, and procedures. As in other strategies, one of the challenges is the rotation of public officials. However, the research also showed opportunities for increasing community management of citizen security through community mediation and conflict resolution, which Resilient Communities may want to explore.

8.3 RECOMMENDATIONS

PADF should strengthen training in alternative mechanisms of conflict resolution to resolve coexistence issues. Although the strategy carries out workshops to improve citizen coexistence, it is necessary to maintain constant training adapted to the cultural characteristics of each territory and the needs of the most vulnerable groups (mainly youth and Indigenous people). It is also necessary to better identify the differences in the approach to citizen security in rural areas of the intervened municipalities. The security context and the strengthening of illegal armed groups in these areas require different approaches, alliances, and procedures to avoid putting the beneficiary communities at risk.

USAID/Colombia should consider a youth program that uses sports, arts, and culture to address community management of citizen security. Sports in preventing youth crime strategies have been implemented in places such as Brazil¹³ and have shown a positive impact on crime prevention. The program could provide tools and resources for youths to realize their talents and skills through sport, art, and culture and provide both ways to prevent the involvement of youth in crime, trafficking, and illegal networks and a platform to share strategies for managing citizen security.

¹³ See GIZ (2017).

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ANNEX A: EVALUATION SCOPE OF WORK

Mid-Term Performance Evaluation Scope Of Work

Resilient Communities

October 18, 2022

SUMMARY

ACTIVITY NAME	Resilient Communities (Somos Comunidad)
USAID OPERATING UNIT	USAID/Colombia
IMPLEMENTER(S)	Pan American Development Foundation (PADF)
COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT / CONTRACT #	Cooperative Agreement No. 72051420CA00002
TOTAL ESTIMATED CEILING OF THE EVALUATED ACTIVITY	\$39,200,000
LIFE OF THE ACTIVITY	October 1, 2020–September 30, 2025
ACTIVE GEOGRAPHIC REGIONS	Cáceres, Caucasia, Carmen de Bolívar, El Guamo, Santander de Quilichao, San Jacinto, Sardinata, Tierralta, Tumaco, Valencia. TBD
REQUIRED EVALUATION?	Yes
EXTERNAL OR INTERNAL EVALUATION	External
EVALUATION TYPE	Mid-term performance

Purpose and intended use: This mid-term performance evaluation aims to gather evidence about midline results and process-level lessons of a selection of key components of USAID/Colombia's Resilient Communities (*Somos Comunidad*). The results and recommendations from this evaluation will be used to adapt activity as well as inform the Mission's future work in citizen security.

BACKGROUND

CONTEXT

Conflict-affected territories are increasingly at risk of backslicing into violent conflict, as they are vulnerable to pressures from criminal networks linked to illegal mining and coca production. The dispute among illegal groups, including non-demobilized factions, for territorial and social control, affects security in these “conflict-affected territories.” In many parts of Colombia, mass displacement, forced confinement, antipersonnel mine accidents, and aggressions against social leaders have skyrocketed. The U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights reported an increase in homicides since 2016, with the number varying across sources. Social leader threats are also on the rise and effectively chill leadership. According to the Government of Colombia’s (GOC) National Protection Unit, most social leaders are targeted for their advocacy related to land issues, illegal mining, and illicit crop substitution. Additionally, the Ombudsman’s Office identified over 400 civil society organizations (CSOs) in 33 areas of the country facing security risks. The violence also disproportionately affects departments, including Cauca, Nariño, Antioquia, and Nortede Santander, and impedes peace and prosperity.

The purpose of Resilient Communities (hereon referred to as “the Activity”) is to strengthen local systems for enhanced human security conditions and thus mitigate the effects of organized criminal groups and other violent incidents in target locations.

USAID/Colombia intends to generate evidence-based, sustainable citizen security programming in rural, conflict-affected locations in Colombia. This entails a local- systems, problem-driven, iterative learning approach which will inform an adaptive, community-responsive, phased intervention process to target geographic locations throughout the life of the activity. Most of this work is done through local stakeholders, facilitating a comprehensive capacity-building process that will ensure sustainability beyond USAID investments. Stakeholders include Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions (such as local and national police, the President’s Advisor for Peace and Stabilization and Ministry of Interior, municipal government representatives, and other relevant institutions), local and civil society actors, community boards, ethnic communities, women, LGBTIQI+ and youth groups as part of the intervention. A key feature of the Activity is intensive collaboration and coordination with civil society, local community counterparts, and other USG-funded activities to create innovative strategies to facilitate violence prevention services in the target locations. These interventions will help reduce the crime and violence experienced in the target locations by mitigating the effects of organized criminal groups and other violent acts.

THEORY OF CHANGE

IF Colombia’s institutions and conflict-affected communities proactively work together to improve community-responsive, sustainable local security systems, AND the social fabric is strengthened through dialogue and trust-building to mitigate relevant threats in target locations, THEN communities will be more resilient against the effects of organized crime and violence.

This theory of change was built upon the assumptions that:

- The social and political situation in Colombia remains stable.
- The security conditions in the target areas remain stable, allowing for activity presence and implementation.
- USAID and the GOC funding levels remain stable.

ACTIVITY'S OBJECTIVES AND RESULTS

Resilient Communities has two primary objectives, each with four sub-intermediate results (sub-IR) as follows:

1. **Enhanced social cohesion:** The Activity will support local civil society actors to promote social dialogue and build individual and collective self-protection networks and self-protection mechanisms. The project will provide focused organizational capacity development and other competency-building strategies to enable civil society actors and communities to become change agents for social cohesion and citizen security in the target locations. Through social behavior change communication (SBCC) approaches and others that promote community cohesion and non-violent conflict resolution, the project will strengthen community resilience to crime and violence. This collaborative approach will also intend to reduce stigmas against social leaders.

Sub-IR 1.1: Local civil society organizations capacity improved.

Sub-IR 1.2: Collaborative mechanisms with security system actors established or supported.

Sub-IR 1.3: Citizen-led, self-protection structure established or supported.

Sub-IR 1.4: Stigma against social leaders and individuals in conflict-affected communities reduced.

2. **Strengthened citizen-responsive security systems:** The activity will support processes for the security systems to effectively prevent, protect against, and respond to crime and violence so that relevant stakeholders, decision-makers, and communities collaborate to develop and oversee informed policies and approaches. Through this activity, the stakeholders will develop and implement improved security plans and security guarantees, as well as human rights prevention and protection approaches. The activity will incorporate data-driven and community-responsive crime and violence prevention and intervention strategies to local security plans. This activity will seek operational-level opportunities for security system actors to foster relational policing strategies such as establishing effective deterrence mechanisms, incorporating community-responsive performance evaluation measures, strengthening communication strategies, and developing relational policing strategies and/or incentives that enhance police effectiveness.

Sub-IR 2.1: Community-responsive relational policing implemented.

Sub-IR 2.2: Community-responsive, participatory security plans implemented.

Sub-IR 2.3: Citizen security approaches developed and implemented.

Sub-IR 2.4: Data- and community-informed crime and violence prevention (CVP) strategies implemented.

This activity involves a phased approach. This will enable the implementation of relevant place-based solutions across multiple regions, accounting for contextual variations and allowing for the scaling up of successful interventions throughout the life of the Activity. The phased approach has an adaptable design and implementation model to support learning and adaptation through the analysis of best practices and lessons learned.

EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy that contributes to police providing responsive services to communities, and to a more legitimate, trustworthy and responsive relationship between police and communities? What have been the bottle-necks and opportunities?
2. To what extent has Resilient Communities implemented a strategy to support crime and violence prevention and positive balance initiatives that is based on evidence and is responsive to community needs? Has the strategy contributed to communities appropriating measures from supported CVPs and IBPS and to a positive perception of their effectiveness? How?
3. To what extent has the methodology implemented by Resilient Communities, through local subgrantee Pastoral Social, been comprehensive and effective to advance social cohesion in target communities?
4. To what extent has the Resilient Communities strategy to support protection at the community level been implemented as planned and been effective in reducing risk factors? How has the strategy responded and adapted to the needs of social leaders and ethnic organizations?
5. How is the Resilient Communities strategy engaging with the most relevant institutional stakeholders and enabling the environment for effective, responsive, and actionable protection strategies? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities in this process?
6. How and to what extent has Resilient Communities contributed to creating, adapting, or implementing policies, plans, regulations, guidelines, and procedures that improve local management of citizen security? What have been the bottlenecks and opportunities in this process?

EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

Cloudburst is expected to develop the evaluation methods before fieldwork begins. Cloudburst should at a minimum:

- Combine and integrate quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques (known as mixed methods), which should include interviews, focus groups, survey data collection, and secondary data analysis as necessary to answer the evaluation questions.
- Include a review of relevant documents, including the Activity's documentation such as reports, work plans, AMELPs, baselines, strategies, and others to gain an in-depth understanding of the program's main goals, activities, and results. The review should also cover academic and related evaluation reports to gain contextual information relevant to answering the evaluation questions.
- Conduct meetings/interviews with the implementing partner and USAID to gain an in-depth understanding of the goals, strategies, and activities related to the evaluation questions and therefore ensure that the approach to answer the questions reflects a true understanding of the interventions.
- Specify the quantitative and qualitative methodologies, define key variables for measurement, and the implications of the proposed information gathering and analysis to answer Evaluation Questions. The proposed methodology should include strategies to assess and reflect likely differences between Resilient Communities implementation geographies or other variables of interest specified in the guiding questions.
- Specify how the proposed methods, sources, and design will allow Cloudburst to answer each evaluation question.

- Provide a description of key variables and their relevant data source(s) per evaluation question and overview of risks and limitations for identified data source.
- Define the data collection strategy that includes logistics, preparation, approach, and tools for mapping information, including a proposal for survey data collection if relevant.
- The primary information gathering uses a statistical sampling strategy for the quantitative analysis, describing the sampling design in detail. The sampling design must include the target population, define the reporting unit, calculate the sample size applying the sampling technique (simple, stratified, conglomerates, etc.), define estimators, the admissible precision and confidence, and define domains of interest (strata/income bracket, sex, age groups, etc.), sample selection technique, and other statistical concepts that describe both knowledge and expertise of the subject and clarity of the method to be applied.
- Specify the primary and secondary sources of information.
- Define a strategy for connecting and providing feedback between quantitative and qualitative information.
- Meet and interview direct beneficiaries, Implementing Partners' staff, relevant service providers, relevant national and local government counterparts at appropriate levels, relevant private sector stakeholders, USAID staff, and, if applicable, experts working in the citizen security sector.

Cloudburst is expected to submit the preliminary evaluation design for review and approval by USAID. This task should be included in the evaluation time frame.

Cloudburst is expected to develop an evaluation design matrix that will include a data analysis plan for each evaluation question.

Cloudburst will also be expected to participate in regular check-in meetings with USAID/Washington, USAID/Colombia, the Resilient Communities implementing partners, and other stakeholders.

Finally, Cloudburst will be expected to participate in a pause and reflect or similar meeting with USAID/Washington, USAID/Colombia, and the Resilient Communities implementing partners so the program may adapt as needed in response to the baseline findings.

DELIVERABLES

The learning partner is expected to submit the following deliverables:

- **Concept Note and Budget:** The Concept Note should include proposed evaluation team members, justification for selected team members, and any issues for discussion with USAID in developing a detailed work plan, a timeline, and a budget narrative. If it would be helpful in developing the Concept Note and Budget, USAID would be happy to conduct a preliminary call.
- **Kickoff meeting and regular check-ins:** An in-brief will be held with the evaluation team and the USAID stakeholders, including the implementing partner. This will be an opportunity for the evaluation team to clarify expectations and ground rules from all parties and raise clarifying questions on the scope of the evaluation questions prior to the start of the work. Regular check-ins should be established either on a biweekly or monthly basis depending on the stage of the research to report on status, learning to date, and ensure effective communication and coordination.
- **Evaluation Work Plan:** The work plan should include an explanation of the evaluation design and methodology, a description of the evaluation team's roles and responsibilities, a design matrix

that links the evaluation questions to data sources and methods, selection criteria for cases (if not the actual cases), selection criteria and potential list of interviewees and sites to be visited, limitations to the evaluation design and mitigation strategies, an explanation of how data will be analyzed, a plan for dissemination and utilization, and an implementation calendar. Annexes should include draft instruments (including questionnaires), a dissemination plan and the SOW.

- **Outbrief: Preliminary findings presentation:** At the conclusion of field work, the evaluation team should provide an outbrief to key evaluation stakeholders with preliminary findings.
- **Draft report:** The draft and final report should be consistent with USAID evaluation report guidance. Among other requirements, any methodological limitations should be clearly noted, findings and conclusions should be well supported, and recommendations should be derived from the findings and conclusions. While the evaluation team has full discretion over the recommendations, it is desirable that they are developed with USAID input to maximize relevance, feasibility, and use. The report should favor brevity; key points should be well highlighted; and content should be easy to understand. Annexes may be used for detailed, technical, or less essential content. The annex should also contain the SOW and any potential conflicts of interest declarations. A list of individuals to receive and review the draft should be developed with USAID ahead of submission and shared directly.
- **Presentation of findings and discussion:** To aid in obtaining feedback and foster learning and utilization at the draft stage, the learning partners should present findings from the draft report to evaluation stakeholders.
- **Final report:** A final report should address reviewers comments and include both a clean copy and tracked changes copy with responses to comments. Alternatively, a comment matrix may be submitted. Only one round of revisions is envisioned but a third submission may be required if there are major concerns with the initial draft or to accommodate small edits. Once approved, a 508-compliant report is posted to the Development Experience Clearinghouse.
- **Infographic:** The evaluation team should produce a short, easily digestible document to explain key findings.
- **Utilization workshop and draft post-evaluation action plan:** The learning partner should facilitate a discussion with USAID and the Implementing Partner on utilization of the findings and develop a draft post-evaluation action plan (using the [USAID guidance and template](#)) to aid in planning (see also [ADS 201.3.6.10.a](#)). (It is the responsibility of the commissioning operating unit—such as a Mission—to finalize and implement this plan.)
- **Dissemination event:** At least one dissemination event is envisioned with a larger USAID and non-USAID audience.
- **Utilization follow-up:** The learning partner should follow up with Missions to obtain the final post-evaluation action plan. If this action plan contains sensitive but unclassified (SBU) information (such as procurement sensitive information), the DRG Center will obtain a copy of the final post-evaluation action plan. Three months and six months from the finalization of the plan, the learning partner or the DRG Center will follow up to track progress in action plan implementation.
- **Preparation and submission of Dataset(s) to the Development Data Library:** Per USAID's Open Data policy (see [ADS 579, USAID Development Data](#)), the Contractor must also submit to the COR and the Development Data Library (DDL), at www.usaid.gov/data, in a machine-readable, non-proprietary format, a copy of any dataset created or obtained in the performance of this award, if applicable. In addition, the dataset should be organized and documented for use by those not entirely familiar with the intervention or evaluation. Please review [ADS 579.3.2.2 Types of Data To Be Submitted to the Development Data Library](#) to determine applicability.

Deliverables timetable [Please review the timetable to ensure that evaluation evidence will be available in time for important decision-making].

ITEM	TIME CUMULATIVE WEEKS)
Concept note, budget, and teaming	2 weeks (3)
USAID review and approval	2 weeks (5)
Kickoff call	1 week (6)
Evaluation work plan	3 weeks (9)
USAID review and approval	2 weeks (11)
Field planning, data collection, and outbrief	8 weeks (19)
Draft report	4 weeks (23)
USAID draft report review and presentation of findings to stakeholders	2 weeks (25)
Final report	2 weeks (27)
Study use workshop (by June 2023)	
Infographic	2 weeks (29)
Submission of data sets to Development Data Library	
Dissemination event	2 weeks (31)
Final action plan emitted by the operating unit	2 weeks (33)

EVALUATION TEAM

Cloudburst will be expected to propose a team that includes local experts who speak Spanish (note that fieldwork will be in Spanish), understand the complex context where Resilient Communities is implemented, and have or can easily build trust among local stakeholders. The team must reflect the necessary expertise and experience to answer each evaluation question (for example, expertise in citizen security, community-police relations, social and behavioral change—social cohesion, etc.). The team must also include expertise in evaluation management, qualitative and quantitative analysis, and communications.

ANNEXES

[Include any relevant documents and links here. We typically establish a shared google drive where files are shared. While this is not necessary at the tasking stage, it will need to be completed by the time the concept note and budget are approved.]

<https://www.usaid.gov/colombia/fact-sheets/pgo-resilient-communities>

ANNEX B: TIMELINE

The table below shows key milestones, timelines, the original deadlines, and the revised deadlines for the tasks throughout the Resilient Communities midterm performance evaluation.

TASK	TIMELINE	ORIGINAL DEADLINE	REVISED DEADLINE
Draft and submit desk review and work plan, including desk review of pertinent documents and a detailed performance evaluation methodology	Four weeks after the kickoff call	February 23, 2023	June 14, 2023
USAID provides feedback on the desk review and work plan	Within two weeks of receiving the document	March 9, 2023	June 28, 2023
Final desk review and work plan submitted	Within seven working days of receiving comments	March 23, 2023	July 10, 2023
Field preparations, including obtaining necessary permissions; programming, translating, testing, and piloting the survey; and preparing introduction letters for interviews	Three weeks—includes survey firm onboarding, IRB approvals, and interview scheduling	February 23–March 23, 2023	June 1–July 31, 2023
In-brief meeting with USAID/Colombia		March 27, 2023	July 31, 2023
Qualitative data collection (survey was discontinued)	Four weeks	March 27–April 28, 2023	July 31–September 13, 2023
Draft performance evaluation report with preliminary findings	Four weeks after the end of data collection	May 26, 2023	October 27, 2023
Findings presentation with USAID and IP		No later than June 9, 2023	November 21, 2023
Receive feedback on the performance evaluation report	Within two weeks of receiving the document	June 9, 2023	November 10, 2023
Draft infographic submitted		June 9, 2023	November 10, 2023

TASK	TIMELINE	ORIGINAL DEADLINE	REVISED DEADLINE
Receive feedback on infographic	Within three weeks of receiving the document	June 23, 2023	December 1, 2023
Final performance evaluation report and comment matrix submitted, which incorporates both written feedback on the draft and feedback from the presentation	Within one week of receiving comments <i>(extended to accommodate presentation scheduled for Nov. 21)</i>	June 23, 2023	November 28, 2023
Utilization workshop			December 1, 2023
Final infographic submitted	Within one week of receiving comments	June 30, 2023	December 8, 2023
USAID final report approval USAID final infographic approval	Within two weeks of receiving the documents	July 14, 2023	December 22, 2023
Report posted to the Development Experience Clearinghouse	Within two weeks of report approval <i>(extended for Christmas holiday)</i>	July 21, 2023	January 12, 2024

ANNEX C: LIMITATIONS

CHALLENGES WITH THE BENEFICIARY DATABASE AND PILOT SURVEY

In collaboration with Cloudburst, the USAID/Colombia office, and PADF, the ET designed a quantitative strategy to address the EQs through a survey instrument. As the ET rolled out the deployment of the survey instrument to the field, the Resilient Communities Evaluation encountered several issues with the Resilient Communities beneficiary database that affected the quantitative data collection. Table C1 below illustrates some of the challenges with the Resilient Communities beneficiary database with respect to the effective number of unique respondents, sampling, response rates, and activity recall of the evaluation survey.

There were 30,564 entries in the beneficiary database. Of those, 9,797 (32 percent) of the beneficiaries had unique IDs. Several beneficiaries participated in more than one activity, which is a positive characteristic of Resilient Communities as it helps to reinforce messages and promotes positive synergies. However, for the purposes of the evaluation, the ET needed to focus on individual beneficiaries. Of the unique IDs, 7,224 (74 percent) had contact information (phone number or email address [no beneficiary addresses were included, unfortunately]). Row #4 in the table shows that of the 7,224 beneficiaries with contact information, 6,752 (93 percent) participated in activities related to EQs 2–4, which are relevant for the quantitative survey as indicated in the evaluation plan. Row #5 denotes that 2,984 eligible beneficiaries reside in the five municipalities selected for the evaluation (which is about 44 percent of the total eligible beneficiaries in the ten municipalities of the Resilient Communities pilot activity). This N=2,984 beneficiaries is the potential eligible sample for the evaluation survey.

However, of the 2,984 eligible beneficiaries for the survey, row #7 shows that only 656 (22 percent) are estimated to have active contact info. This is based on the automated valid phone verification process that CNC, the survey firm, conducted for the evaluation, a very standardized practice in polling and telephone survey research.

These 656 eligible respondents in the five municipalities with active contact info constitute the “actual” survey sample of actionable beneficiaries for the five municipalities. Based on CNC’s pilot test conducted on August 23, 2023, the ET expected about a 33 percent response rate, which would indicate a final sample size of just 216 respondents.

Of the 656 beneficiaries with estimated active contact information—and assuming all of them responded to the survey (which is an unrealistic assumption, given the 33 percent pilot response rate, as described above)—row #8 reveals that only 51 respondents were estimated to recall the Resilient Communities Activity. This is estimated from the pilot test done by CNC, which found that only 7.7 percent of respondents were able to recall the Resilient Communities Activity.

Table C1: Resilient Communities Beneficiary Database Summary

NO.	DATABASE CONCEPT	NUMBER OF CONTACTS
1	Entries in database of beneficiaries	30,564
2	Beneficiaries with unique ID (individual beneficiaries)	9,797
3	Beneficiaries with unique ID with contact info*	7,224
4	Beneficiaries with unique ID and contact info* in 10 Resilient Communities pilot municipalities	6,752
5	Beneficiaries with unique ID and contact info* in 10 Resilient Communities pilot municipalities for EQs 2–4	4,977
6	Beneficiaries with unique ID and contact info* in 5 evaluation municipalities for EQs 2–4	2,984
7	Beneficiaries with unique ID and contact info* in 5 evaluation municipalities for EQs 2–4 with estimated active contact info at 22%**	656
8	Beneficiaries with unique ID and contact info* in 5 evaluation municipalities for EQs 2–4 with estimated active contact info at 22%** and Activity recall at 7.7%***+	51

* The database includes phone numbers or email addresses.

** Based on CNC's automated valid phone verification.

*** Based on CNC's report of the pilot survey.

+ This calculation rests on the optimistic assumption that all of the 22 percent of beneficiaries contacted respond to the survey.

In summary, Table C1 illustrates several issues related to the beneficiary database for the midterm evaluation. Relatively few of the total number of database records were eligible respondents in the five targeted municipalities for the evaluation and of those, very few (22 percent) had validated contact information. Moreover, very few of those cases (based on the pilot's 7.7 percent recall rate) were likely to remember the Resilient Communities Activity without a concerted effort with PADF to provide more Activity-specific detail to prompt respondents' memories and/or other outreach measures to participants to sensitize them to the survey.

The combination of the characteristics of the beneficiary database (depicted in Table C1) and the expected response rate of 33 percent (as indicated from CNC's pilot survey) indicated that the ET would not be able to meet the target sample size of 1,500 survey respondents without expanding the survey beyond the five municipalities. Even by expanding to all ten municipalities of the Resilient Communities Activity (and using a hybrid phone and in-person approach), it would still have been very challenging given the combination of low response rates and low recall rates. Per CNC, using all ten municipalities, the ET could

expect an estimated survey sample of 1,972 contacts. Applying the estimated 33 percent response rate to this number would result in an estimated final sample of 650 beneficiaries.

Comparable studies in Colombia and elsewhere in Latin America exhibit appreciably higher response rates. For example, a project of similar size with a school population in El Salvador had an 80 percent response rate. Smaller projects in the region, albeit focused on the general population, had about a 60 percent response rate. In sum, the combination of an insufficient number of eligible beneficiaries in the database—meaning those with valid contact information, relevant participation in EQs 2–4 activities, and in the target municipalities—and the low response (33 percent) and recall (7.7 percent) rates together presented substantial challenges for obtaining a sufficient survey sample for the midterm evaluation.

Ultimately, in discussions between the ET, CNC (the local survey firm), Cloudburst, USAID/Colombia, and USAID/Washington, USAID made the decision to exclude the survey from the evaluation research design and proceed with the evaluation focusing exclusively on the qualitative data (KIIss and FGDs) already collected.

CHALLENGES WITH QUALITATIVE DATA COLLECTION

CNC, the local survey firm contracted for the evaluation, has well-established and detailed protocols and procedures for conducting qualitative (and quantitative) data collection, including KIIss and FGDs, the types of qualitative data collection methods used by the Resilient Communities performance evaluation. However, due to the challenging context of the Resilient Communities evaluation, several deviations to these procedures were required for the qualitative data collection in the municipalities. These correspond to three of CNC's standard procedures in their Minimum Requirements for Conducting Focus Groups and KIIss guidance: #3, #5, and #6, detailed below. An explanation for why the deviation had to occur is also provided below:

CNC Procedure #3: *Define if incentives will be given: to whom, how (bank transfer, ice cream voucher, supermarket voucher, transfer by digital wallets/e-wallet like PayPal). The delivery of cash is not allowed. This information must be included in the appointment script (also applies for KIIss).*

As an internal policy, CNC generally does not provide monetary incentives to research subjects. The reason for this policy is twofold. First, it tends to generate a negative incentive for potential respondents to participate in studies only if they receive a monetary incentive and could lead to biased responses in favor of the agency providing the monetary incentive. In addition, having teams of enumerators carrying and delivering cash in the field increases the risk of becoming targets of a crime. For this reason, CNC generally prefers not to provide cash incentives.

For this particular study, CNC waived its internal policy and accommodated the needs of the evaluation by providing a cash incentive for respondents in rural areas. The justification behind this benefit is that the time and effort that participants devote to this activity represents a wage loss for not engaging in their usual productive activities, which needs to be compensated.

CNC Procedure #5: *Initiate the appointment process at least three days in advance (also applies for KIIss).*

CNC Procedure #6: *Have a database that contains at least five times the required number of participants (also applies for KIIss).*

Because the beneficiary database did not contain sufficient people with valid contact information to meet the quotas of interviews and focus group attendees per municipality (see Table C1 above), CNC had to proceed with identifying respondents “on the spot” in the territories to issue the interview invitation immediately, without being able to fully adhere to the minimum of three days established by their standard procedures.

In sum, due to the rural nature of many of the locations within the municipalities, as well as the insufficient number of beneficiaries with valid contact information in the database, the ET had to devise and implement workarounds to several standard CNC data collection procedures to proceed with the data collection.

ANNEX D: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS TOOLS

KII AND FGD INSTRUMENTS

As described in the main body of the report, the Resilient Communities midterm performance evaluation included two qualitative data collection methods: KIIs and FGDs. The Spanish-language topic guide, organized by EQ, is presented below. The far right column indicates if the question was included in the interviews, the FGDs, or both.

EVALUATION QUESTION I

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PREGUNTAS ESTRATÉGICAS PARA EQ I Y MISCELÁNEAS		DATA SOURCE
EQ 1	EQ1. ¿Cómo y en qué medida ha aplicado Somos Comunidad una estrategia que contribuye a que la policía preste servicios receptivos a las comunidades y a que la relación entre la policía y las comunidades sea más legítima, digna de confianza y receptiva? ¿Cuáles han sido los obstáculos y las oportunidades?	
PE 1	¿Cree usted que los ciudadanos, líderes y demás actores del proceso se sienten seguros en sus territorios gracias a la labor y servicios prestados por la Policía Nacional? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 2	¿Cree usted que la percepción de seguridad de la comunidad debida a los servicios prestados por la Policía Nacional es mejor, peor o igual a la percepción de seguridad de la de hace 2 o 3 años atrás? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 3	¿Cree usted que las acciones que desarrolla la Policía Nacional son suficientes para garantizar la seguridad de la población y los actores en territorio? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 4	¿Considera usted que el trabajo desarrollado por la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha mejorado la confianza en la Policía Nacional? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 5	¿Cree usted que las acciones realizadas entre las organizaciones de la sociedad civil (OSC) y los actores del sistema local de seguridad, en el marco de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad, han permitido fortalecer la cohesión social de manera eficiente para los pobladores? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PE 6	¿Cuáles han sido los obstáculos para que la policía preste servicios eficientes y para mejorar la relación entre la policía y la comunidad en el marco de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD
PE 7	¿Cuáles han sido las oportunidades para que la policía preste servicios eficientes y para mejorar la relación entre la policía y la comunidad en el marco de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD

EVALUATION QUESTION 2

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD			
EQ 2		EQ2. ¿En qué medida Somos Comunidad ha aplicado una estrategia de apoyo a las iniciativas de prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia y de equilibrio positivo que se base en evidencia y responda a las necesidades de la comunidad? ¿Ha contribuido la estrategia a que las comunidades se apropien de las medidas de los programas de prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia y de los programas de equilibrio positivo apoyados y a que tengan una percepción positiva de su eficacia? ¿De qué manera?	
PREGUNTAS ESTRATÉGICAS PARA EQ 2 Y MISCELÁNEAS		DATA SOURCE	
PE 1	¿Cree usted que los ciudadanos, líderes y demás actores del proceso perciben como positiva la eficacia del programa de Somos Comunidad ? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII	
PE 2	¿Cree usted que las comunidades han apropiado (o no) los programas de prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia, tales como (escoja los siguientes de acuerdo al municipio) Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII	
PE 3	¿Cree usted que las acciones de prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia en Tierralta, El Guamo, El Carmen de Bolívar, Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco implementadas por Somos comunidad han respondido a las necesidades de la comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII	

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PE 4	¿Cree usted que las acciones de Iniciativas con Balance Positivo en Tierralta, El Guamo, El Carmen de Bolívar, Santander de Quilichao, Tumaco implementadas por Somos comunidad han respondido a las necesidades de la comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 5	¿Considera usted que el trabajo desarrollado por la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha favorecido la seguridad en los territorios en materia de prevención de la delincuencia y la violencia? ¿Cómo? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII

EVALUATION QUESTION 3

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PREGUNTAS ESTRATÉGICAS		DATA SOURCE
PE 1	¿Conoce usted el trabajo desarrollado por Pastoral Social en el marco de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 2	¿Cómo cree usted que el trabajo adelantado por Pastoral Social mediante la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha integrado a los ciudadano minorías étnicas, líderes y representantes de la comunidad de manera efectiva, para promover la participación de éstos? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD
PE 3	¿Considera usted que la metodología aplicada por Somos Comunidad en el territorio por Pastoral Social ha sido efectiva para integrar la población a la comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 4	¿Cree usted que la integración de la ciudadanía jóvenes, comunidades étnicas, mujeres y LGBTQIA+ en los territorios priorizados (cohesión social) es mayor, menor o igual hoy, con respecto a la que se percibía hace 2 o 3 años? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 5	¿Cómo cree usted que se puede fomentar la integración de la ciudadanía a la comunidad (cohesión social) en las comunidades destinatarias para que sea efectiva? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD	
PE 6	¿Cree usted que la metodología aplicada por Somos Comunidad para fomentar la cohesión social y la seguridad de la comunidad en los territorios tiene algún tipo de enfoque para la mujer, la comunidad campesina, la comunidad LGBTQIA+, las comunidades indígenas? – Por favor explique cómo.

EVALUATION QUESTION 4

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PREGUNTAS ESTRATÉGICAS		
		DATA SOURCE
PE 1	¿Conoce usted la estrategia de Somos Comunidad para el apoyo de la protección de la comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 2	¿Conoce usted cuáles son los factores de riesgo asociados a la seguridad de la comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII / FGD
PE 3	¿Cree usted que la estrategia de Somos Comunidad es efectiva para reducir los factores de riesgo asociados a la seguridad en los territorios? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 4	¿Cree usted que la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha respondido y se ha adaptado a las necesidades de los líderes sociales e indígenas? ¿Cómo? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 5	¿Adicionalmente a los factores de riesgo asociados a las comunidades étnicas y líderes comunitarios, cuáles cree usted que pueden ser otros factores de riesgo que afectan la seguridad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD
PE 6	¿Cree usted que las estrategias desarrolladas por Somos Comunidad permiten mejorar las acciones para la autoprotección y autocuidado para mejorar la seguridad de la comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PE 7	¿Cree usted que tras la aplicación de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad han disminuido los factores de riesgo para la comunidad en el área urbana y en el área rural? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 8	¿Qué acciones cree usted que deben ser adelantadas en su región para que disminuyan los factores de riesgo asociados a líderes sociales e indígenas? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD
PE 9	¿Actuaría usted o permitiría que un miembro de su familia trabajara como líder o lideresa social en su territorio? – Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 10	¿Conoce la aplicación ELLA? ¿La ha descargado?	Survey (discontinued)

EVALUATION QUESTION 5

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
EQ5.		
EQ5.	EQ5. ¿Cómo la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha permitido relacionarse con los actores institucionales clave y cómo está facilitando el entorno para unas estrategias efectivas, receptivas y de protección viables? ¿Cuáles han sido los cuellos de botella y las oportunidades en este proceso?	
PREGUNTAS ESTRATÉGICAS		DATA SOURCE
PE 1	¿Cree usted que la estrategia de Somos Comunidad se ha relacionado con los actores institucionales clave (Policía, alcaldía, defensoría)? – ¿De qué manera?	KII
PE 2	¿Cree usted que la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha facilitado el desarrollo de estrategias de protección viables y aceptadas por los actores del proceso? Por favor, explique su respuesta Salado para la prevención del consumo de sustancias psicoactivas	KII
PE 3	¿En el marco de la implementación de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad cuáles cree que han sido los cuellos de botella (aspectos difíciles o negativos) en el proceso asociados a la seguridad en los territorios? Por favor, explique su respuesta	FGD
PE 4	¿En el marco de la implementación de la estrategia de Somos Comunidad cuáles cree que han sido las oportunidades (aspectos positivos) en el	FGD

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
	proceso asociados a la seguridad en los territorios? Por favor, explique su respuesta	
PE 5	¿Cree usted que el relacionamiento entre los actores institucionales clave es mejor, peor o igual ahora con respecto al relacionamiento con los actores clave hace 2 o 3 años atrás? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 6	¿Cree usted que las estrategias de protección son efectivas y cumplen con las necesidades en materia de seguridad para las comunidades locales del proceso? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII

EVALUATION QUESTION 6

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PREGUNTAS ESTRATÉGICAS		DATA SOURCE
EQ6	EQ6. ¿Cómo y en qué medida ha contribuido Somos Comunidad a crear, adaptar o implementar políticas, planes, reglamentos, lineamientos y procedimientos que mejoren la gestión local de la seguridad ciudadana? ¿Cuáles han sido los cuellos de botella y oportunidades en este proceso?	
	¿Ha recibido capacitación sobre estos?	
PE 1	¿Cree usted que la estrategia de Somos Comunidad ha mejorado la gestión local de la seguridad ciudadana?	KII
PE 2	¿Conoce usted las acciones realizadas por Comunidades Resilientes para generar, ajustar e implementar políticas (ejemplo inclusión de enfoque LGBTI en la PONAL), planes (Plan Integral de Seguridad y Convivencia ciudadana-PISC en Tierralta, El Guamo, El Carmen de Bolívar, Santander de Quilichao, Tumac) u otros instrumentos para mejorar la seguridad ciudadana? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 3	Conoce el Código de convivencia y seguridad ciudadana (CNSCC)? Si lo conoce, cree usted que el código ha contribuido en la cohesión social o en fortalecer la seguridad comunitaria de la estrategia Somos Comunidad? Por favor, explique su respuesta	KII
PE 4	¿Cuáles cree que han sido los cuellos de botella (aspectos difíciles o negativos) para mejorar la seguridad ciudadana en el marco del programa Somos Comunidad?	FGD

PREGUNTAS BÁSICAS DE EVALUACIÓN (EQ)—SOMOS COMUNIDAD		
PE 5	¿Cuáles cree que han sido las oportunidades (aspectos positivos) para mejorar la seguridad ciudadana?	FGD
PE 6	¿Cree usted que la seguridad ciudadana está igual, es mejor o peor actualmente, con respecto a la seguridad ciudadana de hace 2 o 3 años? – Explique su respuesta –	KII
PE 7	¿Cómo cree usted que la estrategia de Somos Comunidad puede contribuir al mejoramiento de la gestión local de la seguridad ciudadana?	FGD
PE 8	¿Conoce los Mecanismos Alternativos de Solución de Conflictos? / Ha recibido capacitación sobre estos?	KII

ANNEX E: TYPES OF KII INTERVIEWEES AND FGD PARTICIPANTS CONSULTED

The tables below contain the KII and FGD participant categories for the qualitative data collection, which took place between August 8 and September 8, 2023. A total of 63 KIIs with key stakeholders and 15 FGDs with stakeholders and beneficiaries were conducted.

Table E1: Types of KII Participants, by Location

KII PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES		
CATEGORY	POSITION	LOCATION
CNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Leader of the dynamic team for the new police service model and the Neighborhood Police program of the national police (Bogotá) Researcher at the Intelligence and Prospective Center of the CNP (Bogotá) Member of the police force (Bogotá) Citizen Security Liaison—Police (Carmen de Bolívar) Citizen Security Liaison Patrol Officer (Carmen de Bolívar) Citizen Security Liaison Patrol Officer (Carmen de Bolívar) Citizen Security Liaison Patrol Officer—Police (Carmen de Bolívar) Commander (El Guamo) Police Inspector—Police (El Guamo) Commander Tierralta Patrol Officer (Tierralta) Patrol Officer (Tierralta) Sublieutenant (Santander de Quilichao) Police Commander Tumaco (San Andrés de Tumaco) Patrol Officer (San Andrés de Tumaco) Patrol Officer (San Andrés de Tumaco) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bogotá Tierralta in Córdoba El Guamo in Bolívar El Carmen De Bolívar in Bolívar Santander De Quilichao in Cauca San Andrés De Tumaco in Nariño

KII PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES

CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Leader R2-Citizen Security-PADF (Bogotá) • Technical Specialist R2-Citizen Security-PADF (Bogotá) • Leader RI-Social Cohesion-PADF (Bogotá) • Ojorubí Corporation of the Emberá Katio indigenous community (Bogotá) • LGBTQI+ participants (Bogotá) • Advisor to the IGO's Delegate for Human Rights (Bogotá) • Association of Agricultural Producers and Traders of the Montes de María (ASPROMONTES) (Carmen de Bolívar) • Association of Women Victims of Villa Amalia Village (ASDEMUVIA) (Carmen de Bolívar) • Association of Women Victims of Santa Cruz de la Enea (El Guamo) • Community Council of Robles de Robles Almirante Padilla (El Guamo) • Coordinator of a Surveillance Academy (Tierralta) • National Association of Rural Users (Tierralta) • Foundation Weaving Dreams of Hope—FUNTESU (Santander de Quilichao) • Foundation Weaving Dreams of Hope—FUNTESU (Santander de Quilichao) • CSO (San Andrés de Tumaco) • Community Council of the South Pacific (San Andrés de Tumaco) • Tumaco Carnival Committee (San Andrés de Tumaco) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bogotá • Tierralta in Córdoba • El Guamo in Bolívar • El Carmen De Bolívar in Bolívar • Santander De Quilichao in Cauca • San Andrés De Tumaco in Nariño
Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth Beneficiary (Carmen de Bolívar) • Youth Beneficiary (Carmen de Bolívar) • Youth Beneficiary (El Guamo) • Youth Beneficiary (El Guamo) • Youth Beneficiary (Tierralta) • Youth Beneficiary (Tierralta) • Youth Beneficiary (Santander de Quilichao) • Youth Beneficiary (Santander de Quilichao) • Youth Beneficiary (San Andrés de Tumaco) • Youth Beneficiary (San Andrés de Tumaco) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tierralta in Córdoba • El Guamo in Bolívar • El Carmen De Bolívar in Bolívar • Santander De Quilichao in Cauca • San Andrés De Tumaco in Nariño

KII PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES		
Municipal Mayor's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Official from the Ombudsman's Office (Tierralta) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tierralta
Implementer USAID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Pastoral Social regional liaison (Bogotá) Regional Coordinator Montes de María FUPAD (Carmen de Bolívar) FUPAD Territory Liaison (El Guamo) Thematic Promoter for Bolívar (El Guamo) Regional Coordinator FUPAD Córdoba (Tierralta) Regional Coordinator FUPAD Córdoba (Tierralta) Regional Coordinator FUPAD Cauca (Santander de Quilichao) Regional Coordinator FUPAD Nariño (San Andrés de Tumaco) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bogotá Tierralta in Córdoba El Guamo in Bolívar El Carmen De Bolívar in Bolívar Santander De Quilichao in Cauca San Andrés De Tumaco in Nariño
Ministry of the Interior	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Advisor of the Comprehensive Guarantees Program for Women Leaders and Human Rights Defenders (Bogotá) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bogotá
Local government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Secretary of Government (Carmen de Bolívar) Secretary of Social Development for Women (Carmen de Bolívar) Family Commissioner's Office of Guamo (El Guamo) Secretary of Education and Culture (El Guamo) Contractor for the Secretary of Social Welfare and Community Participation with an ethnic component (Santander de Quilichao) Secretary of Government Santander de Quilichao (Santander de Quilichao) Public servant (San Andrés de Tumaco) Alderman, Hazme Tú Organization (San Andrés de Tumaco) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> El Guamo in Bolívar El Carmen De Bolívar in Bolívar Santander De Quilichao in Cauca San Andrés De Tumaco in Nariño

Table E2: Types of FGD Participants

FGD PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES	
CATEGORY	POSITION
CNP	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Patrol Officer (Tierralta) • Patrol Officer (Tierralta) • National Police of Colombia (Santander de Quilichao) • National Police of Colombia (Santander de Quilichao)
CSOs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Association of Agricultural Producers and Traders of the Montes de María (ASPROMONTES) (Carmen de Bolívar) • CSO (Carmen de Bolívar) • Association of Women Victims of Santa Cruz de la Enea (El Guamo) • Association for the Dignity of Victims of El Guamo (El Guamo) • Community Council of Robles de Robles Almirante Padilla (El Guamo) • CSO (El Guamo) • CSO (El Guamo) • CSO (Tierralta) • CSO Nuevo Renacer—Participant in the Responsible and Non-Violent Masculinities Strategy Activity (Tierralta) • National Association of Rural Users (Tierralta) • AITAMA (Tierralta) • National Association of Rural Users (Tierralta) • Productive CSO COOPERATIVE COMANCE (Santander de Quilichao) • CSO (San Andrés de Tumaco)
Youth	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth Beneficiary (Carmen de Bolívar) • Youth Beneficiary (El Guamo) • Youth Beneficiary (Tierralta) • Youth Beneficiary (Santander de Quilichao)

FGD PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Youth Beneficiary (Santander de Quilichao) • Youth Beneficiary (San Andrés de Tumaco)
Municipal Mayor's Office	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Municipal Subcommittees for Prevention, Protection, and Non-Repetition Guarantees (SPPGNR) (Tierralta) • SPPGNR (Tierralta) • Police Inspector (El Guamo) • Police Inspector (El Guamo)
Implementer USAID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Caribe Afirmativo (Carmen de Bolívar) • FUPAD Contractor (Carmen de Bolívar) • FUPAD Implementer (Carmen de Bolívar) • Thematic Promoter for Bolívar (El Guamo) • Implementers (Tierralta) • Municipal Liaison Somos Comunidad (FUPAD) (Santander de Quilichao) • Social Pastoral (Santander de Quilichao) • Social Pastoral (Santander de Quilichao) • Implementer (San Andrés de Tumaco) • Implementer (San Andrés de Tumaco)
Ethnic organization or LGBTQI+	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • LGBTQI+ Organization (Carmen de Bolívar) • Caribe Afirmativo (Carmen de Bolívar) • Leader (El Guamo) • Ethnic or LGBTQI+ Organization (El Guamo) • Ethnic or LGBTQI+ Organization (Tierralta) • Ethnic or LGBTQI+ Organization (Tierralta) • ASOM (Afro) (Santander de Quilichao) • Ethnic or LGBTQI+ Organization (San Andrés de Tumaco) • President of the CAB (San Andrés de Tumaco)

FGD PARTICIPANT CATEGORIES

Local government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for the police inspection (Carmen de Bolívar) • Mayor's representative (El Guamo) • Representative of the Ombudsman • Victims' liaison (Tierralta) • Victims' table (Tierralta) • Social worker (Santander de Quilichao)
JACs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guarantees Table Leader (Carmen de Bolívar) • Community Council of Robles AP (El Guamo) • Community Council of Robles (El Guamo) • Community Council of Robles (El Guamo) • Community Network (Tierralta) • Community Leader—legal representative and president of the Community Action Committee (CAC) (Tierralta) • CAC (Santander de Quilichao) • Indigenous Leader Páez Jerusalén (Santander de Quilichao) • River Basin Council Quebrada • CAC (Santander de Quilichao) • CAC (Santander de Quilichao) • Life and Hope (Santander de Quilichao) • CAC (San Andrés de Tumaco) • Community Council (San Andrés de Tumaco) • CAC (San Andrés de Tumaco) • Community Council (San Andrés de Tumaco)

ANNEX F: SOURCES OF INFORMATION

The table below presents the key documents reviewed by EQ. It also presents the AMELP indicators.

Table F1: List of Documents Reviewed, by Evaluation Question

EQ	KEY DOCUMENTS	AMELP INDICATOR
EQ1	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans 1–2 • AMELP • Sub-activity sheets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Indicator RC-16: Number of community-responsive relational policing strategies implemented per target area.
EQ2	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans 1–2 • AMELP • Sub-activity sheets 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P-1/2.0.0-21: Number of target neighborhoods or communities implementing USG-supported CVP initiatives or strategies. • P-1.2.2-15: Number of new groups or initiatives created through USG funding that are dedicated to resolving the conflict or drivers of conflict (PS.6.2-1). • RC-02: Number of individuals who complete citizen security, social cohesion, and CVP training with USG assistance.
EQ3	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans 1–2 • AMELP • Sub-activity sheets • Reports of strengthening activities • Methodologies and training content • Products generated by CSOs • Organizational Performance Index results reports 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P-CC-158: Number of organizations that apply and increase their performance category. • RC-02: Number of individuals who complete citizen security, social cohesion, and CVP training with USG assistance. • P-1.2.0-10: Number of self and collective protection mechanisms under implementation as a result of USAID assistance. • P-1/2.1.2-28: Number of individuals/organizations implementing enhanced self-protection measures.
EQ4	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans 1–2 • AMELP • Sub-activity sheets • Reports on activities of partners and contractors • Methodologies and training content • Diagnostic reports • Protection protocols • Protection structures designed 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • RC-02: Number of individuals who complete citizen security, social cohesion, and CVP training with USG assistance. • P-1.2.0-10: Number of self and collective protection mechanisms under implementation as a result of USAID assistance. • P-1/2.1.2-28: Number of individuals/organizations implementing enhanced self-protection measures. •

EQ	KEY DOCUMENTS	AMELP INDICATOR
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Communication campaigns designed 	
EQ5	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans 1–2 • AMELP • Sub-activity sheets • Progress and final reports • Methodologies • Meeting minutes with local governments • Technical documents about public policy interventions • Evidence of the presentation and dissemination of institutional protection pathways 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P-2.2.1-57: Number of public policies introduced, adopted, repealed, or changed consistent with citizen input. • P-1.2.0-10: Number of self and collective protection mechanisms under implementation as a result of USAID assistance. • P-1/2.1.2-28: Number of individuals/organizations implementing enhanced self-protection measures. •
EQ6	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Annual work plans 1–2 • AMELP • Sub-activity sheets • Progress and final reports of the technical assistance processes • Meeting minutes with local governments • Comprehensive Citizen Security and Coexistence Plan • Comprehensive Prevention and Protection Plans • Public policy instruments • Evidence of the presentation and adoption of policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • P-2.2.1-57: Number of public policies introduced, adopted, repealed, or changed consistent with citizen input. • RC-02: Number of individuals who complete citizen security, social cohesion, and CVP training with USG assistance. •

ANNEX G: EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS

Table G1 below presents the members of the ET, including biographical descriptions of their academic training, research background, and policy expertise.

Table G1: Evaluation Team Members

PERSONNEL	SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS
Evaluation Co-Lead Dr. Javier Osorio	Javier Osorio is an Assistant Professor in the School of Government and Public Policy at the University of Arizona. He brings to the team a robust set of quantitative analysis tools to analyze security challenges in Latin America and sound skills to build bridges with stakeholders in the international, government, and civil society sectors. He has a PhD in political science from the University of Notre Dame, with research interests in analyzing the micro-dynamics of political and criminal violence in Latin America with a primary focus on Colombia, Mexico, Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador. He provides a strong methodological background, with experience conducting field and survey experiments, quasi-experimental strategies, and advanced computational social science modeling. He has experience conducting a series of large-scale measurement projects tracking the presence and behavior of armed actors in Colombia and Mexico with the support of grants from the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Department of Defense.
Evaluation Co-Lead Dr. Liliana Duica Amaya	Dr. Duica began her career analyzing patterns of land dispossession by Colombia's illegal armed actors and conducting fieldwork along the borders with Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru. She supported the implementation of post-conflict policies on land titling, rural development, and state building in challenging ecological contexts in Colombia's Pacific, Caribbean, and Amazon regions. She assessed the main human rights challenges in Colombian departments heavily affected by coca crops and drug trafficking (UNODC) and the main violence challenges for vulnerable claimants of dispossessed territories within restitution processes (USAID), and she identified patterns used by illegal armed actors to seize lands including the use of cattle, woods, palms, and other kinds of agriculture and livestock (Open Society Institute). She also researched the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia guerrilla strategies used to grab lands in fragile ecosystems (Universidad de los Andes—law faculty) and hybrid governance on Colombia's southern border (CUNY University). She is a lecturer in the Center for Latin American Studies in the School of Foreign Service and the Department of Anthropology at Georgetown University and she also advises non-governmental organizations in the Amazon forest in nature-based solutions to mitigate deforestation and tackle land grabbing. Dr. Duica has a PhD in anthropology, an MA in political science, anthropology, and geography, and a BA in political science and government.

PERSONNEL	SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS
Citizen Security Expert Dr. Daniel Mejia Londoño	<p>Dr. Mejia is an associate professor at the Department of Economics at Universidad de los Andes. Prior to coming back to Universidad de los Andes, he was the Director of Policy and Strategy of the Attorney General's Office in Colombia between July 2018 and June 2019, and Secretary of Security of Bogotá, Colombia, between 2016 and May 2018, in which position he was in charge of leading security and justice policies in the city of Bogotá. Before becoming the first Secretary of Security of Bogotá in January 2016, Dr. Mejia was an associate professor in the Department of Economics and Director of the Research Center on Drugs and Security (CESED) at Universidad de los Andes in Bogotá, Colombia, where he taught since 2006. He received a BA and MA in economics from Universidad de los Andes and an MA and PhD in economics from Brown University. Between 2011 and 2012, Dr. Mejia was a member of the Advisory Commission on Criminal Policy; more recently, he was the President of the Colombian Government's Drug Policy Advisory Commission. In March 2015, Dr. Mejia was awarded the Juan Luis Londoño prize, awarded every other year to the best Colombian economist under 40, for his research agenda on drugs and drug policy in Colombia.</p>
Research Analyst Daniela Maria Ospina Gonzalez	<p>Daniela Ospina is a final-year student at the Universidad de los Andes, pursuing a degree in political science and global studies. She has also undertaken supplementary studies in Economics and Development Studies. Her academic and practical interests revolve around topics related to development, the environment, culture, and education. Daniela has great experience in both academic and practical realms, having actively engaged in fieldwork leadership projects within local communities in various municipalities in Colombia since 2020.</p>

ANNEX H: POTENTIAL SYNERGIES WITH OTHER ACTIVITIES

Table H1 below presents a list of USAID activities and IPs active in Colombia as of November 2023 and the ET's estimated synergy potential with Resilient Communities.

Table H1: USAID Activities and Implementing Partners

IMPLEMENTING PARTNER	ACTIVITY	SYNERGY POTENTIAL
OFFICE OF RURAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT		
Acumen	Investing For Peace Fund/ <i>Fondo Invirtiendo Para La Paz</i>	High
Fintrac Inc.	Producers To Market Alliance/ <i>Programa De Alianzas Comerciales</i>	Moderate
Bancamia	<i>Emprendimientos Productivos Para La Paz—Empropaz</i>	High
Tetra Tech	Land For Prosperity/ <i>Nuestra Tierra Próspera</i>	High
Tetra Tech	Community Development And Licit Opportunities/ <i>Territorios De Oportunidad</i>	High
Chemonics International	Rural Finance Initiative	Moderate
Small Enterprise Assistance Funds	<i>Fondo De Agronegocios Colombia</i>	Moderate
Small Enterprise Assistance Funds	Colombia Agri-Business Fund	Moderate
U.S. Department Of Agriculture	Cacao For Peace	Moderate
Colanta	Bittercasava For A Sweet Milk/ <i>Yuca Amarga Para Una Dulce Leche</i>	Moderate
Fundación Luker	The Cocoa Effect/ <i>El Efecto Cacao</i>	Moderate
Corporación Interactuar	Let's Go Bajocauca/ <i>Avancemos Bajo Cauca</i>	Moderate
United Nations Development Programme	Reactive-Action Program	Moderate
OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENT		
Chemonics International	Natural Wealth/ <i>Riqueza Natural</i>	Moderate
Chemonics International	<i>Paramos & Bosques</i>	Moderate

U.S. Energy Association, Tetra Tech, National Renewable Energy Laboratory	Renewable Energy	Moderate
CEMI	Territorios De Vida	Moderate
PEACEBUILDING AND GOVERNANCE OFFICE		
Universidad De Los Andes	Public Opinion Activity	High
Chemonics International	Human Rights Activity	High
Chemonics International	Justice For A Sustainable Peace Program/ <i>Justicia Para Una Paz Sostenible</i>	High
United Nations Office of the High Comission for Human Rights	Support to the Mandate of the United Nations Office of the High Comission for Human Rights	Moderate
Fundacion Arcangeles	Sportpower2	Moderate
Fulbright Scholar	Afro-Colombian Leadership And Scholarship Program	High
Centro Colombo Americano	MLK Program	High
International Organization For Migration	Victims Institutional Strengthening Program	High
CODHES	Civil Society Participation Project	High
ACDI/VOCA	Program Of Alliances For Renconciliation/ <i>Alianzas Para La Reconciliación</i>	High
Fundación Prolongar	Landmine Victims Reconciliation Activity	High
Fundación Antonio Restrepo Barco	Safe Steps/ <i>Pasos Seguros</i>	High
Jaime Arteaga Y Asociados	<i>Mujeres De Oro/Women Of Gold</i>	High
Fundación Carvajal	Activa Buenaventura	High
Fundación Ideas Para La Paz	Cocoa Connects	Moderate
Jaime Arteaga Y Asociados	IRENE	Moderate
Cocomacia	Peaceful And Productive Atrato/ <i>Por Un Atrato En Paz Y Productivo</i>	High
Corporación Manos Visibles	Pacific In Progress/ <i>Avanza Pacifico</i>	Moderate
DAI	Partners For Transparency/ <i>Juntos Por La Transparencia</i>	Moderate
United States Institute Of Peace	Citizen Security Dialogues Activity/ <i>Diálogos De Seguridad Ciudadana</i>	High

DAI	Responsive Governance Activity/ <i>Gobernabilidad Responsable</i>	High
ACDI/VOCA	Youth Resilience Activity/ <i>Jóvenes Resilientes</i>	High
AFRODES & ONIC	Inter-Ethnic Alliance For Peace/ <i>Alianza Inter-Étnica Para La Paz</i>	High
International Organization For Migrations	Weaving Lives And Hope	High
Organization of American States	Peace Process Support Mission of the Organization Of American States/ <i>Misión De Apoyo Al Proceso De Paz</i>	High
VENEZUELAN RESPONSE AND INTEGRATION OFFICE		
International Organization For Migrations	Community Stabilization Activity/ <i>Estabilización Comunitaria</i>	High
World Food Program	School Feeding Activity	High
Freedom House, Inc.	Venezuelan Migrant Human Rights Activity— <i>Conectando Caminos Por Los Derechos</i>	High
Partners Of The Americas, Inc.	Juntos Aprendemos: Delivering Quality Education In Migrant Receptor Communities In Colombia.	High
Abt Associates	Local Health System Sustainability Project/ <i>Comunidades Saludables</i>	High